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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND THE
LIMITS OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Dr. Ronen Perry*
Abstract: This Article uses the unprecedented disaster in the Gulf of Mexico as an
opportunity to critically evaluate the law pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution before
and after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act. This topic is analyzed as a derivative of a
more general concern, namely the internal harmony of civil liability regimes. The Article
unveils a general incongruity in American land-based and maritime tort law that surfaced
through the Exxon Valdez litigation, and examines whether subsequent statutory reform has
eliminated the problem in the limited context of marine oil pollution, using the Deepwater
Horizon incident as a test case.
Part I systematically discusses pre-OPA law. It focuses mainly on two salient features of
the Exxon Valdez litigation, namely exclusion of liability for purely economic losses, and
punitive damages. Part II explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to incongruity on the
justificatory level, delineates the contours of the problem, and proposes a conceptual
framework for resolution. Part III examines whether the enactment of the OPA has created a
more defensible liability regime.
Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, there have been calls for raising the OPA
liability caps or an even more comprehensive legislative reform. While some of the
initiatives seem to have waned, this catastrophic incident, like the earlier Exxon Valdez case,
will surely leave its mark. This article, which highlights relevant policy concerns, will
undoubtedly serve policymakers in reassessing the limits of civil liability for marine oil
pollution.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, while drilling at the Macondo Prospect, a seabed
location about forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana, an
explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling
rig.1 The rig was owned and operated by Transocean, the world’s largest
offshore drilling contractor, and leased to BP, one of the world’s largest
energy companies and the lessee and principal operator of the Macondo
field.2 The explosion caused a blowout (an uncontrollable escape of oil),
killed eleven workers, and ignited a fire that led to the sinking of the
rig.3 After the explosion, an attempt to activate the blowout preventer
(BOP) failed, and oil started gushing into the Gulf of Mexico, causing
horrific harm to the marine environment, fouling the shores of Alabama,
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and resulting in multibillion dollar
losses to the fishing and tourism industries, among others.4 On July 15,
nearly three months after the deadly explosion, BP announced that it had
capped the hemorrhaging well, stopping the flow of crude oil into the
Gulf.5 On August 3 through 4, heavy drilling mud, followed by cement,
was pumped from a surface vessel through a choke line into the blowout
1. H.R. REP. NO. 111-521, at 5 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Bryan Walsh, With Oil Spill (and Blame) Spreading, Obama Will Visit Gulf, TIME, May 1,
2010, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1986323,00.html (“[T]he Louisiana fishing
industry could sustain $2.5 billion in losses, while Florida could lose $3 billion in tourism
income.”).
5. See Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Caps Its Leaking Well, Stopping the Oil After
86 Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/us/16spill.html.
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preventer to completely seal the well.6 Two relief wells were drilled to
ensure permanent plugging of the gusher,7 and on September 19 a
federal official announced that the Macondo well was effectively dead.8
But while the flow has stopped, the legal saga has only just begun.
More than two decades ago, the Exxon Valdez oil spill shocked
America. The notorious supertanker ran aground on Bligh Reef off the
Alaskan coast on March 24, 1989, spilling eleven million gallons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound.9 Exxon spent $2.1 billion in
cleanup efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines,
settled a civil action by the United States and Alaska, and paid $303
million in voluntary settlements with private parties, principally
fishermen.10 Subsequent civil litigation has spanned nearly two decades.
This litigation resulted in a $287 million compensatory damages award
to commercial fishermen and a settlement with Alaska Natives,11 and
culminated in a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the proper amount
of punitive damages.12 At the time, the Exxon Valdez spill was the worst
environmental disaster in U.S. history.13 But it has been dwarfed by the
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, which can now claim the dubious title
of the world’s largest accidental release of oil. According to the most
recent estimate, 4.9 million barrels (more than 200 million gallons) of oil
were released from the well, of which approximately 800,000 barrels
were captured by BP, leaving more than four million barrels to gush into
the Gulf.14 BP spent billions of dollars on containment and cleanup.15
Nearly 170,000 claims were submitted to BP’s claims offices, and later
to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility,16 by September 3.17 Over two hundred
6. See Clifford Krauss, ‘Static Kill’ of the Well is Working, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05spill.html.
7. See id.; Henry Fountain, Relief Well to Be Completed in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/14spill.html.
8. Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well Is Finally ‘Dead’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/us/20well.html.
9. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476–78 (2008).
10. Id. at 479.
11. Id. at 481.
12. Id. at 489–514.
13. See George J. Church, The Big Spill: Bred from Complacency, the Valdez Fiasco Goes from
Bad to Worse to Worst Possible, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38.
14. See Campbell Robertson, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html.
15. Press Release, BP, Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7064849.
16. “The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (‘GCCF’) is an independent claims facility for submission
and resolution of claims of Individuals and Businesses for costs and damages incurred as a result of
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lawsuits—representing tens of thousands of victims—were filed against
BP by mid-June 2010,18 and Gulf coast states sought payouts for lost
revenue and other damages.19 BP, Transocean, and other parties will
probably spend many years litigating these claims and negotiating
settlements.
This Article, which follows up on my recently published work,20 uses
the unprecedented disaster in the Gulf of Mexico as an opportunity to
critically evaluate the law pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution
before and after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).21 This
topic is analyzed as a derivative of a more general concern: the internal
harmony of civil liability regimes. This Article unveils a general
incongruity in American land-based and maritime tort law that surfaced
through the Exxon Valdez litigation, and examines whether subsequent
statutory reform has eliminated the problem in the limited context of
marine oil pollution, using the Deepwater Horizon incident as a test
case.
The emphasis on the award of punitive damages in recent literature on
the Exxon Valdez spill has overshadowed an extremely important part of
the litigation, namely the wholesale rejection of numerous claims for
purely economic loss by the federal district courts in the early 1990s.
Thus, on the one hand, liability for economic loss was strictly limited
under the exclusionary rule instituted in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint,22 leaving many victims of the Exxon Valdez disaster
uncompensated.23 On the other hand, liability was expanded through an
award of punitive damages to relatively few successful claimants. While
these two components of the litigation might not seem incompatible
the oil discharges due to the Deepwater Horizon incident on April 20, 2010 . . . . BP has agreed to
contribute funds to an escrow account to be used to pay claims submitted to the GCCF.” Frequently
Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last
visited Jan. 8, 2011).
17. See Press Release, supra note 15.
18. See Jef Feeley & Margaret C. Fisk, BP Suits Should Be Sent to New Orleans, U.S. Says,
BUSINESSWEEK, June 17, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-suits-shouldbe-sent-to-new-orleans-u-s-says-update2-.html.
19. Neil King et al., States Weigh Big Claims Against BP, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704846004575332932978558908.html.
20. Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 GA. L.
REV. 407 (2011) [hereinafter Perry, The Exxon Valdez]; Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573 [hereinafter Perry, The Economic Bias].
21. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 507 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2719) (2006).
22. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
23. But see infra notes 260–71 and accompanying text.
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from a simple doctrinal perspective, they are inconsistent on a deeper
theoretical level.
The exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are both
exceptions to general principles of private law. The rule barring recovery
for purely economic loss is an exception to the general principle that one
whose unreasonable conduct caused foreseeable harm to another is liable
for that harm, which is probably the most fundamental principle in
modern tort law.24 The exclusionary rule reduces the extent of liability to
prevent adverse consequences, such as over-deterrence or undue
punishment.25 Punitive damages are an exception to the general principle
that tort damages should restore the victim to the pre-tort condition
(restitutio in integrum), which is the most fundamental principle in the
modern law of remedies.26 These damages are used as a supplementary
sanction in exceptional cases where compensatory damages do not
provide the necessary levels of deterrence and retribution.27
When both the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine
are applicable to a particular case, they simultaneously increase and
decrease the wrongdoer’s liability. The exclusionary rule limits liability
to prevent over-deterrence, over-punishment, etc., whereas the punitive
damages doctrine expands liability to enhance deterrence and
retribution. When applied in tandem these rules cancel out each other’s
allegedly legitimate effects. Increasing and decreasing liability
simultaneously is unwarranted not only because it makes the application
of at least one rule frivolous, but also because it comes at the price of
two problematic deviations from general principles of private law, along
with a distributive concern: numerous plaintiffs are denied recovery for
actual losses caused by the defendants’ wrongdoing, while others obtain
damages that significantly exceed their actual loss.
This Article thus sets out to elucidate a general problem that surfaced
in an oil pollution case, and to examine whether it has been solved in the
limited context of marine oil pollution by the OPA. Part I discusses preOPA laws applicable to marine oil spills using the Exxon Valdez incident
as a test case. Part II explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to

24. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for
Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006) (explaining that the no-recovery rule is an
exception to general negligence doctrine).
25. See infra Part I.A.1.a.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); cf. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d
920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured
party . . . to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party.”).
27. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
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incongruity on the justificatory level, delineates the contours of this
problem, and proposes a conceptual framework for resolution.
Generally, it holds that where liability must be expanded beyond the
limits set by the exclusionary rule in order to obtain certain levels of
deterrence and retribution, relaxing the exclusionary rule and allowing
more victims to recover is a more defensible path than awarding punitive
damages to very few claimants. The former simply extends the
application of two general principles of tort law, whereas the latter is
based on problematic exceptions to these universal principles and
generates distributive injustice. Part III examines whether the enactment
of the OPA has created a more defensible liability regime, using the
Deepwater Horizon incident as a test case. Note that although the
problem identified in this Article is manifested in the Exxon Valdez
litigation, it is not limited to oil spills. Therefore, even if the OPA has
provided a more defensible liability regime, it has done so only with
respect to marine oil pollutions. The general problem still stands and has
to be resolved through judicial creativity or legislative reform.
Three methodological comments must be made at this stage. First,
while civil liability for oil pollution has been the subject of international
conventions for decades, the United States has chosen to hew its own
way and not to join the international system. In 1969, following the
Torrey Canyon spill in the English Channel,28 an international
conference adopted the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (known as the CLC).29 The CLC imposed strict
but limited liability on owners of ships from which oil was discharged
for cleanup costs and private damages and introduced compulsory
liability insurance.30 The International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,31
adopted two years later, set up an international fund which provided
compensation in excess of the vessel owner’s liability under the CLC, or
where the owner is insolvent or not liable under the CLC.32 The original
28. See Mans Jacobsson, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Oil Spills from
Ships and the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 29 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 378,
378 (1994); Beth Van Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in United States Law, 22 INT’L LAW. 319, 320–21 (1988);
Sidney A. Wallace & Temple L. Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They Be Cleaned Up?, 57
TUL. L. REV. 1343, 1355 (1983).
29. Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45.
30. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 321; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1356–57.
31. Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11 I.L.M. 284.
32. See Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1356, 1358–59.
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conventions were practically replaced by the 1992 Protocols which
increased liability caps and raised the maximum amount payable by the
fund.33
The international scheme was endorsed by most countries, including
many common law jurisdictions.34 But the United States, which
participated in the international negotiations and signed the original
conventions, has ratified neither, mainly because compensation under
the international scheme—which would have been exclusive if
adopted—was deemed too low.35 This is still the case today, following
the enactment of the OPA. Although the bill authorized implementation
of the two conventions, the Senate adamantly objected.36 So the OPA
merely expresses
the sense of the Congress that it is in the best interests of the
United States to participate in an international oil pollution
liability and compensation regime that is at least as effective as
Federal and State laws in preventing incidents and in
guaranteeing full and prompt compensation for damages
resulting from incidents.37
The higher caps of the OPA, along with the likelihood of additional
liability under state law, make ratification of these conventions by the
United States practically impossible, because they cannot be “as
effective as Federal and State law.”38 Because this Article purports to
critically evaluate the structure of the American liability regime, a
detailed analysis of the international system is excluded despite its
outstanding global significance.
Second, although this Article uses the Deepwater Horizon incident as
a test case, it focuses only on pollution-related harm. The recent
catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates other risks associated

33. See Jacobsson, supra note 28, at 378; Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages Under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 283, 288 (1993).
34. See, e.g., Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) s 3–12 (Austl.); Protection of
Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Funds) Act 1993 (Cth) schs 1–3 (Austl.); Marine Liability Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 6, §§ 47–105 (Can.); Liability for Oil Pollution Damages Act, 2004, SH No. 274 (Isr.);
Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21, §§ 152–82 (U.K.).
35. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 323, 326; Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 1 (1990).
36. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 16–17 (1991).
37. Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 3001, 104 Stat. 507–08 (1990).
38. See George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 237, 240–45 (1991); Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 24; Steven R.
Swanson, OPA 90 + 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 After Ten Years, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 135,
140 (2001).
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with oil production and transportation, particularly the risk of personal
injury and death. Eleven employees lost their lives following the
explosion and seventeen were injured. These consequences are governed
by federal legislation and, to some extent, by general maritime law. The
Jones Act establishes a cause of action for negligence against an
employer for an injury or death caused to a seaman in the course of
employment.39 To qualify as a seaman, an employee’s duties must
“contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its
mission,” and he or she must have “a connection to a vessel in
navigation . . . that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its
nature.”40 Mobile drilling rigs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, have
long been considered vessels for the purposes of the Jones Act.41 So at
least some of the surviving victims of the explosion, along with relatives
of the deceased, may have a cause of action under this Act. Non-fatal
injuries might also be recoverable under general maritime law,42 while
fatalities are also covered by the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA).43 Marine employees who do not qualify as seamen may
recover from their employers under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA),44 which Congress extended to injuries
occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer continental
shelf.45 The importance of liability for physical injuries is undisputed,

39. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. 2009); Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154
(1964) (“[T]he Act gave recovery only for negligence.”). The Jones Act limits recovery to
pecuniary loss. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
40. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting McDermott
Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that the
Jones Act covers barges designed to serve as mobile drilling platforms); Offshore Co. v. Robison,
266 F.2d 769, 779–80 (5th Cir. 1959) (same).
42. See, e.g., Gosnell v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Jones Act
negligence and unseaworthiness [under general maritime law] are two separate and distinct
claims.”).
43. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006). This Act preempts any action for wrongful death under general
maritime law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1978). It coexists with the
Jones Act in cases of wrongful death of seamen on the high seas. Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n,
644 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D.R.I. 1986). But the Jones Act also applies to non-fatal injuries on the
high seas and to wrongful death not on the high seas. DOHSA also limits recovery to pecuniary
losses. 46 U.S.C. § 30303.
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2006). Seamen cannot recover under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(3)(G) (2006), so the LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive. Chandris, 515 U.S.
at 355–56. An employer’s liability under the LHWCA is exclusive, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2006), and
therefore precludes liability under general maritime law and the DOHSA. Stansbury v. Sikorski
Aircraft, 681 F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1982).
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but a critical appraisal of civil liability for oil pollution should not be
eclipsed by a painstaking discussion of the law applicable to accidental
losses not related to the pollution itself.
Third, this Article acknowledges the likelihood of civil and criminal
fines for oil pollution, and the interrelation between the severity of these
sanctions and the extent of civil liability for the same conduct. For
instance, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)46 provides
that the owner and operator of any vessel or facility from which oil is
discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the United States,
adjoining shorelines, or the waters of the contiguous zone, shall be
subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to $25,000 per day of violation
or $1000 per barrel of oil discharged.47 Criminal and civil fines may then
be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.48 However, this Article focuses on civil liability, and therefore
does not provide a comprehensive analysis of relevant criminal and civil
penalties.
I.

LIABILITY IN THE PRE-OPA ERA

This Part discusses pre-OPA law applicable to marine oil spills, using
the Exxon Valdez incident as a test case. Part I.A focuses on general
maritime law. Part I.A.1 shows that relational economic losses are
generally irrecoverable under general maritime law and reviews the
main justifications for the exclusionary rule. While Exxon was found
liable for the lost catch of commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives
under an established exception to the exclusionary rule, the court
rejected all other claims for relational losses ensuing from the spill. Part
I.A.2 explains the concept of punitive damages and its dominant
justifications and discusses the chronicles of the punitive award in the
Exxon Valdez litigation. Part I.B reviews pre-OPA federal legislation
pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution, such as the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act. Part I.C discusses relevant state legislation,
such as the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act, which was invoked
by the claimants in the Exxon Valdez litigation.

46. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
47. Id. § 1321(b)(3), (b)(7)(A).
48. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991).
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Aquatic pollution may have harsh and widespread repercussions. In
addition to harm to wildlife and natural resources,49 property damage,50
and possibly bodily injuries, various economic losses may ensue.
Commercial fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, and the like may lose their
livelihood. Customers of these fishermen, such as seafood restaurants,
retail shops, or canned food manufacturers, may incur additional
expenses or even shut down temporarily, and suppliers of services and
goods to the local fishing industry may lose profit. Owners of shoreline
hotels, resorts, recreational areas, and other tourist-based businesses may
suffer economic loss. Owners and charterers of ships unable to sail
across the area of the spill, as well as owners of cargo delayed by the
obstacle, may also incur loss. Those involved in the real estate industry
in coastal states, such as builders, real estate agents, bankers, and
lawyers, may face a decline in business. Suppliers, customers,
employees, and relatives of any of the above may lose profits or incur
unanticipated expenses.
These economic losses may be classified as relational losses. A
relational economic loss is a loss of profits or an expense that stems
from physical injury to the person or property of a third party or to an
ownerless resource.51 Starting with Anthony v. Slaid,52 and with very few
deviations, American courts have consistently denied recovery for this
kind of loss.53 The leading authority for the exclusionary rule is Robins

49. The state may recover for this harm as a trustee of the public. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V
Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099–1102 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1060, 1066–67 (D. Md. 1972); California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D.
Cal. 1969); see also Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670–72 (1st Cir. 1980)
(upholding a statute allowing a state agency to recover).
50. These are generally recoverable. See, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th
Cir. 1973); Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225, 226–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
51. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1574.
52. 52 Mass. 290, 291 (1846) (holding that an extra expense incurred following a personal injury
to a third party was “too remote and indirect”).
53. See also Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 758–59 (1877) (holding that an insurance company
cannot recover an amount paid under a life insurance policy following the intentional killing of the
insured by the defendant because the loss was too remote); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & New
Haven R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 274, 276–77 (1856) (same).
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Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,54 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that “a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under
a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.”55
Notwithstanding its explicit reference to a contractual relationship
between the plaintiff and the immediate victim of the wrong, and to the
defendant’s unawareness of such relationship, this case was broadly
interpreted to exclude liability for any relational economic loss, whether
the relationship between the two victims was contractual or
noncontractual,56 known or unknown to the doer of the wrong.57 Further
attempts to restrict the court’s ruling to lost profits as opposed to
positive outlays,58 to negligence as opposed to other forms of action
(e.g., nuisance),59 or to maritime law as opposed to land-based common
law,60 have also failed.
Federal courts have generally accepted the broad interpretation of
Robins Dry Dock and have applied it to the great majority of relational
loss cases.61 Only a few narrow exceptions have been recognized.62 Most
54. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
55. Id. at 309. For further discussion of this case, see Henry D. Gabriel, Testbank: The Fifth
Circuit Reaffirms the Bright Line Rule of Robins Dry Dock and Fails to Devise a Test to Allow
Recovery for Pure Economic Damages, 31 LOY. L. REV. 265, 267–71 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg,
Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249 (1991); David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss Under U.S. Maritime Law: Sixty
Years Under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 625 (1st Cir. 1994); Barber
Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021, 1023–24 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Oriental Republic Uru., 821 F. Supp.
950, 954 (D. Del. 1993); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Steele v. J & S Metals, Inc., 335 A.2d 629, 630 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1060–61 (La. 1984); Ferguson v. Green Island
Contracting Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
58. See, e.g., Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 51–52; In re Cleveland Tankers, 791 F. Supp. at 677.
59. See, e.g., Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 56–57; Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1030–31; Dick Meyers
Towing Serv. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41
A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. 1945).
60. See, e.g., Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 627–28; In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp.
697, 703 (D.N.J. 1995).
61. See, e.g., Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5 v. Jays Seafood, Inc., 444 F.3d 371, 377–81 (5th Cir.
2006); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. M/T Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829, 832–33 (3d Cir. 1985); Barber Lines,
764 F.2d at 51–52; Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1021–28; Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d
1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 1983); Akron Corp. v. M/T Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 152–53 (5th Cir. 1983);
Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34, 35 (11th Cir. 1982); Marine Navigation Sulphur
Carriers v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 638 F.2d 700, 702 (4th Cir. 1981); Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore
Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212, 213–14 (5th Cir. 1980); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. M/V Bayou
LaCombe, 597 F.2d 469, 472–74 (5th Cir. 1979); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., 577 F.2d at 1024–25;
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972).
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state courts have also embraced the bright-line rule.63 Only a few courts
have replaced it with a more generous approach. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, held that one owes a duty of care to take
reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing purely economic loss to
particular individuals or individuals comprising an identifiable class with
respect to whom one knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer
such loss from one’s conduct.64 Still, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
explicitly endorsed the majority view.65
The exclusionary rule is an exception to the general principle that one
whose unreasonable conduct caused foreseeable harm to another is liable
for that harm.66 Overriding a general principle requires defensible
reasons; if these reasons cease to exist, the exception must be set aside
and the general principle should be reinstated.
Some of the common justifications for denying liability for relational
economic losses turn on the fear of open-endedness. In Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,67 Justice Cardozo observed that allowing claims for
purely economic loss may expose the wrongdoer to “liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.”68 Although Ultramares was not a relational loss case, the same
rationale has been invoked in numerous relational loss cases as the
principal reason for exclusion of liability.69 The validity of this argument
rests on two assumptions: a real likelihood of open-endedness and its
undesirability.
The soundness of the first assumption, open-endedness, seems selfevident. A negligent infliction of personal injury may result in economic
62. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1613–17.
63. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & New Haven R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 275 (1856);
Koskela v. Martin, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gosch v. Juelfs, 701 N.W.2d 90, 91
(Iowa 2005); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103
(N.Y. 2001); Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 501 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
64. People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985); see also
Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 359–61 (Alaska 1987).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (“One is not liable to another for
pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other.”).
66. See Bernstein, supra note 24.
67. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
68. Id. at 444.
69. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); In re
Waterstand Marine, Ltd., No. 87-1516, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3242, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979–80 (E.D. Va. 1981); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E.
419, 420 (Ga. 1903). Stapleton observes that the concern with indeterminate liability is one of the
three crude ideas used to rationalize the exclusionary rule. Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic
Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 536 (2002).
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loss to the victim’s relatives, customers, creditors, suppliers, employers,
and partners; the loss of each of those may economically affect others,
and so on. Similarly, injuring a factory may cause economic loss to its
suppliers, distributors, consumers, business partners, and employees;
owners of businesses where employees customarily shop may lose
profits; and so forth. Theoretically, such proliferation of economic losses
is boundless, so the potential number of relational victims is vast and
indeterminate. This phenomenon may be termed “the ripple effect.”70
The larger the number of valid claims, the more extensive the liability;
and if the potential number of victims is large and uncertain, potential
liability is also large and uncertain. I have conceded elsewhere that the
assumption of open-endedness may be unsound in certain types of
cases.71 In some fact situations the number of potential victims is limited
and reasonably foreseeable.72 Moreover, a multiplicity of victims does
not necessarily yield multiple actions and extensive liability, because not
all victims sue73 and not all claimants recover.74 However, these
reservations do not apply to catastrophic oil spills, where the number of
victims is not only uncertain ex ante but potentially enormous, where
procedural mechanisms reduce per capita cost of litigation thereby
inducing victims to sue, and where the defendant may be a deeppocketed corporation.
Regarding the second assumption, undesirability, three aspects of the
“ripple effect”75 should be distinguished: the number of victims, the
extent of liability, and uncertainty about both. The potential number of
victims (the first aspect of the ripple effect) may in itself have some
normative significance. For example, denial of liability in cases of
multiple victims may be an efficient way to secure ex post loss
spreading.76 Furthermore, allowing numerous relational victims to
70. See, e.g., Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 302 (Can.) (La
Forest, J., dissenting); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 LAW
Q. REV. 249, 266, 285 (1991).
71. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1600–01.
72. See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1972).
73. Cf. John Summers, Comment, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic
Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 145, 150 (1983) (discussing cases where the injurer is insolvent or
it is too costly for the victim to bring an action against the injurer).
74. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 266, 282 (explaining that the ordinary principles of tort
liability, such as proximate cause, serve as rough screening devices).
75. See supra note 70.
76. See Robert Hayes, The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic Loss, 12 MELB. U. L.
REV. 79, 114 (1979); Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification
for the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711, 761–63 (2004) [hereinafter Perry, Relational
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recover may open the door to a mass of litigation which might
overwhelm the courts,77 although this problem may be solved at least in
part through procedural mechanisms such as consolidation of actions or
class actions in appropriate cases.78
At any rate, the relevance of the potential number of claimants largely
depends on the rough correlation between the number of valid claims
and the extent of tort liability (the second aspect of the ripple effect).
The likelihood of extensive liability is deemed normatively relevant for
several reasons. First, from a retributive justice perspective, allowing
recovery for relational losses may give rise to an extreme disproportion
between the severity of the sanction and the gravity of the wrong.79 An
insignificant and perhaps absentminded deviation from the objective
standard of care cannot justify the imposition of such an onerous
penalty.80 Second, the marginal deterrent effect of tort liability may
diminish to zero, because at a certain point no further precautions are
available or because the expected payment is limited by defendants’
financial capacity or statutory caps.81 Allowing recovery where the
marginal benefit in terms of deterrence is smaller than the administrative
cost involved is economically wrong. In other cases, the fear of
unconstrained liability may unduly restrict potential tortfeasors’ freedom
Economic Loss]; Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 738 (2006).
77. Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1172–73 (7th Cir. 1983); Stevenson
v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty v Dredge
“Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529, 562–63 (Austl.) (Stephen, J., concurring); Bow Valley Husky
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (1997), 153 D.L.R. 4th 385, 404 (Can.); John G.
Rich, Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage—J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 431, 434; Ann O’Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood
of Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 966 (1989).
78. Caltex Oil (1976) 136 CLR at 606 (Murphy, J., concurring); Christopher V. Panoff, Note, In
re the Exxon Valdez, Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living,
and the Special Injury Rule, 28 ENVTL. L. 701, 711–12 (1998).
79. See, e.g., Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Phoenix
Prof’l Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hirmer, 502 P.2d 164, 165 (Ariz. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766C cmt. a (1979); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1534, 1538 (1985) (asserting that abhorrence of
disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior is the most plausible explanation for judicial
reluctance to allow recovery for pure economic loss); see also Gabriel, supra note 55, at 266;
Hayes, supra note 76, at 82; O’Brien, supra note 77, at 967; Rich, supra note 77, at 434.
80. But cf. Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1931–32 (2002) (criticizing this type of argument).
81. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985); Donald Harris
& Cento Veljanovski, Liability for Economic Loss in Tort, in THE LAW OF TORT: POLICIES AND
TRENDS IN LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC LOSS 45, 53 (Michael Furmston
ed., 1986).
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of action and hinder socially beneficial initiatives and activities.82 Third,
from an ex post perspective, unconstrained liability may be “crushing.”83
Businesses whose activities are generally beneficial might be
overburdened, their operation might be impaired, and some may even
collapse. Fourth, as the extent of potential liability grows, insurance
companies may refuse to cover liability, demand an unreasonable
premium, or set an upper limit for the cover, thwarting loss spreading.
Fifth, if potential liability is truly very large, potential injurers’
motivation to purchase liability insurance—where available—shrivels
and losses are not spread.84 Sixth, from an interest-hierarchy distributive
perspective, assuming that any defendant has a limited pool of assets that
all successful claimants ultimately need to share, denial of liability for
relational losses may be required to guarantee full recovery for injuries
to physical interests which may be considered more deserving of legal
protection.85 This argument loses much of its force where the primary
injury is to a tangible resource. Even if the superiority of life and bodily
integrity is undisputed,86 a distinction between property damage and
purely economic loss in terms of interest hierarchy is hard to justify.87
Seventh, from a compensatory perspective, when defendants have
limited funds, each victim may end up with compensation for a very
small fraction of his or her loss, rendering the costly process futile.88
82. See Phoenix Prof’l Hockey Club, 502 P.2d at 165; Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279; Andrew W.
McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principles of Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic
Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1520 n.17 (1983); Roger B. Godwin, Negligent Interference with
Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664, 676–79 (1964); O’Brien,
supra note 77, at 967–68; Rich, supra note 77, at 435.
83. Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983); Leadfree
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1983); Bruce Feldthusen, Pure
Economic Loss in the High Court of Australia: Reinventing the Square Wheel?, 8 TORT L. REV. 33,
49 (2000).
84. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 240 (1987) (showing that
injurers whose assets are lower than the harm they may cause can be in a better position without
insurance); Harris & Veljanovski, supra note 81, at 53 (noting that potential defendants may
underinsure if they believe they are judgment-proof).
85. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 352–53, 355 (Can.) (La
Forest, J., dissenting); Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 1933–35, 1937–38, 1943, 1950 (applying this
argument to emotional and economic losses).
86. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 125 (2001) (observing that physical injury is
more disruptive to the pursuit of one’s life plan than a loss of money).
87. See Christopher Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence—The Search for a Just Solution,
50 CAN. BAR REV. 580, 584 n.22 (1972).
88. Dominion Tape of Can., Ltd. v. L.R. McDonald & Sons, Ltd. (1971), 21 D.L.R. 3d 299, 300
(Can.) (“[A] judgment pompously engrossed which cannot be executed for want of sufficient assets
on the part of the judgment debtor [turns the trial] into a futile exercise.”).
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The third aspect of the ripple effect is that the extent of potential
liability—the number of potential victims and the particulars of
individual harms—is uncertain, leaving potential injurers incapable of
preparing for contingencies.89 Furthermore, first-party insurance is
arguably a more efficient means of spreading losses than liability
insurance associated with tort liability,90 and uncertainty related to the
ripple effect augments the advantages of the former. While first-party
insurance covers well defined injuries to the insured’s interests, liability
insurance covers third parties’ losses, whose number and extent are
unknown in advance.91
A second set of justifications for the exclusionary rule concerns the
proper level of deterrence, regardless of the fear of open-endedness. The
conventional economic justification for Robins Dry Dock is that many
financial losses—particularly relational losses—are not true social
costs.92 According to economic theory, efficient deterrence requires
internalization of the social cost of every inefficient act by the actor.93 In
assessing social costs, it is important not to add private losses that reflect
“wealth transfers,” namely diminution of personal wealth that generates
corresponding gains to others.94 Such gains do not mitigate the private
loss, but cancel it out in the calculation of the externalized social cost.95
Internalization of private losses irrespective of the parallel gains may
lead to over-deterrence. Arguably, many relational economic losses
correspond to resulting economic gains. If the competitors of an
interrupted business can easily increase their production during the
interruption at no cost beyond normal production costs, their gain will
offset the unfortunate business’ loss. The farther demand is from its
peak, the smaller the market share of the interrupted business, and the
shorter the interruption, the easier it is for the competitors to stand in for
the unfortunate business without destabilizing market equilibrium.
Because demand is seldom at its peak,96 economic loss caused by a

89. See ROBBY BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC LOSS 200–01 (1993); FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER
CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 371–72 (3d ed. 1999); Stapleton, supra note 70, at 543–
44.
90. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
91. See Posner, supra note 76, at 737–38.
92. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1982).
93. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence,
and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000).
94. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4–7; Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 733.
95. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4; Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 733.
96. See Posner, supra note 76, at 737.
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temporary disturbance to production in a single business significantly
exceeds the social cost in most cases.97 Moreover, consumers and
producers can use inventories to meet demand during the interruption
and, under these circumstances, profits are postponed or shifted with no
significant social cost. To conclude, exclusion of liability for relational
losses prevents internalization of private losses that do not reflect a true
social cost.98
Another deterrence-based justification turns on the fact that the
injurer is already liable for the physical injury. The marginal deterrent
effect obtained from holding the injurer liable for a relational loss may
be nil whenever the cost of taking optimal care is lower than the ensuing
reduction in expected liability for physical injuries.99 Alternatively, the
marginal deterrent effect of a relational claim may be lower than the
administrative cost involved in shifting the additional loss.100 So even if
all relational losses were true social costs, allowing recovery might not
be cost-justified.
A third set of justifications for the exclusionary rule focuses on
plaintiffs’ ability to protect themselves. Traditionally, courts viewed
contract law as the appropriate venue for economic loss claims.101
However, this perception has taken varying forms in different contexts.
For example, a common argument in shoddy products cases was that
allowing the buyer or the user to sue the seller or the producer in tort
might undermine or circumvent the contractual allocation of risk.102 In

97. Considerable social costs may occur once in a while. But identifying these rare cases and
trying to evaluate the respective social costs is not worthwhile. The cost of gathering and processing
the necessary information is significantly higher than the social cost that would consequently be
internalized. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 17.
98. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4. This view is now firmly established in the academic
literature. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 251 (1987); SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 138–39; Feldthusen, supra note 83, at 50–51;
Bruce Feldthusen & John Palmer, Economic Loss and the Supreme Court of Canada: An Economic
Critique of Norsk Steamship and Bird Construction, 74 CAN. B. REV. 427, 436, 439 (1995); Victor
P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 19–22, 31–32, 36–37 (1994); McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 82, at 1531; Posner, supra note 76,
at 736–37. Stapleton observes that this is one of the three crude ideas used to rationalize the
exclusionary rule. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 536–37.
99. See Harris & Veljanovski, supra note 81, at 52–53.
100. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 163; Bruce Feldthusen, Economic Loss in the Supreme
Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow, 17 CAN. BUS. L. J. 356, 378–79 (1991); Posner, supra
note 76, at 740; see also Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 301
(Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting).
101. See Stapleton, supra note 69, at 536, 551.
102. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872–73 (1986) (“Contract
law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort
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relational economic loss cases the abstract perception of the contract-tort
interrelation has assumed a somewhat different form.103 Many judges
and scholars contend that the typical relational victim could protect his
or her interest through a contract with the primary victim and that failing
to do so justifies exclusion of liability for several reasons.104 First, a
victim who was aware of the financial risk and could easily protect
against it, but refrained from doing so, arguably assumed the risk.105
Second, where a potential victim enters a contract and agrees to bear a
certain risk, the risk is usually priced into the contract, and the potential
victim is thereby compensated ex ante for bearing it.106 Non-pricing of
the risk indicates that it was deemed insignificant by the parties and, as
such, not worthy of the tort system’s attention. Third, tort litigation is
wearisome and costly, so if one can protect one’s interest more simply
and cheaply, one should be encouraged to do so. Fourth, consensual
transactions are generally preferable to collective intervention. A
possible response to this line of argument is that protection through
contract is frequently impractical due to asymmetric bargaining
power,107 lack of information about potential risks,108 the prohibitive cost
of negotiating contractual provisions for every contingency,109 or the
absence of any contractual link between the plaintiff and the primary
victim.
A more sophisticated version of the same argument is that where an
injury to a certain person or to a person’s property may result in
economic losses to others, and where transaction costs are low, the law
seeks to “channel” economic losses through the primary victim to save
the cost of multiple tort actions.110 A channeling contract is a contractual
arrangement whereby the primary victim agrees to indemnify relational

involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements . . . Since a
commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power . . . we see no
reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of the risk.” (citation omitted)).
103. See Stapleton, supra note 69, at 551–54.
104. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); John G.
Fleming, Tort in a Contractual Matrix, 3 TORT L. REV. 12, 18–19 (1995).
105. See David Howarth, Economic Loss in England: The Search for Coherence, in CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 27, 48 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed., 1996).
106. But see Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 374 (Can.).
107. Id. at 351 (La Forest, J., dissenting); id. at 374.
108. Id. at 351 (La Forest, J., dissenting).
109. See William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The
Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 366 (1986).
110. Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 283
(1982).
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victims for their losses.111 Channeling saves the costs of litigating
independent relational loss claims and may thus be economically
desirable.112 According to this argument, the law encourages channeling
by denying recovery for relational losses and allowing recovery for
economic losses that have been shifted to the primary victim.113 I have
shown elsewhere why this argument is unpersuasive.114 More
importantly, the argument does not apply to economic losses caused by
oil pollution, because oceanic resources have no owner with whom
potential victims can negotiate channeling provisions.
A related justification for the exclusionary rule derives from the
notion of loss-spreading. The underlying assumption is that first-party
insurance is a more efficient means of spreading relational losses than
liability insurance associated with tort liability.115 The cost of
information required for evaluating the risk is usually lower in the case
of first-party insurance, because there is no need to assess third parties’
expected losses. The costs of establishing the right for compensation are
also lower, because first-party insurance does not hinge on tort litigation
or tort negotiation. Exclusion of liability induces potential victims to
insure themselves against prospective personal losses, and potential
injurers not to insure themselves against liability for these losses. It
thereby guarantees efficient loss spreading while preventing double
insurance.116

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1601–04. I will not provide a full explanation
here, so as not to be repetitive. Generally, the channeling theory “is valid only if four conditions are
met: (1) allowing recovery for the shifted loss is in itself warranted, (2) the costs of negotiating
channeling provisions are truly lower than the subsequent reduction in administrative costs, (3) the
traditional legal dichotomy encourages potential victims to negotiate channeling arrangements that
they would not otherwise consider, and (4) there is no better way to minimize administrative costs.”
Id. at 1602. In The Economic Bias, I showed that in most cases, one or more of these conditions will
not be met.
115. Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v.
Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (1997), 153 D.L.R. 4th 385, 404 (Can.); Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk
Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 350 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting); Feldthusen &
Palmer, supra note 98, at 437, 443–44; James, supra note 72, at 52–53; Michael MacGrath, The
Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Negligence—An Emerging Dichotomy, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 350, 375 (1985); O’Brien, supra note 77, at 968.
116. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th at 352, 354 (La Forest, J., dissenting); Feldthusen,
supra note 83, at 48–49; James, supra note 72, at 54–55. Ambiguous liability formulas (such as
“proximity”) frequently result in double insurance.
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Another self-protection argument is that exclusion of liability for
relational losses gives potential victims an incentive to take precautions
to prevent harm117 and gives actual victims an incentive to mitigate
damages by diverting means of production used in the interrupted
activity to other lucrative uses.118 For example, to avoid loss in cases of
accidental power failure, businesses can install stand-by systems ex ante,
or they can try to make up for the loss by doing more work when the
interruption ends.119 Similarly, where a towed barge sinks, the tugboat
owners will not suffer economic loss if they use their vessel to haul
another ship;120 and when a factory is damaged and closed for repairs,
workers will not incur loss if they obtain alternative employment.121 A
possible response is that the defenses of comparative negligence and
mitigation of damages provide the necessary incentives.122 They do so at
a somewhat higher administrative cost than exclusion of liability,123 but
in a less arbitrary manner.
Lastly, the exclusionary rule is said to provide a certain and easily
applicable limitation on tort liability.124 As a “bright-line rule,”125 it
enables potential injurers and victims to better prepare for
contingencies,126 impels actual victims to avoid fruitless litigation,
thereby saving its cost, and makes the administration of tort actions by
the courts easier and less costly.127 A possible response is that justice is
more important than certainty128 —otherwise there would be no liability
at all. Liability should be limited in a just and principled manner, not
through arbitrary bright lines. A milder version of the argument is that
117. See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 55.
118. See Hayes, supra note 76, at 114.
119. Spartan Steel & Alloys, Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1972] 3 All E.R. 557, 563–64 (C.A.) (Eng.).
120. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 23–24.
121. See id. at 17–18. However, one may say that if workers of the damaged factory find
alternative employment they displace other workers. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Economic Loss
Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 205 (1982).
122. SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 144–46.
123. Goldberg, supra note 98, at 17.
124. Candlewood Navigation Corp. v. Mitsui OSK Lines, Ltd., [1985] 2 All E.R. 935, 945 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from N.S.W.) (“[The rule draws] a definite and readily ascertainable line.”); Leigh &
Sillavan, Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1986] 2 All E.R. 145, 153–54 (H.L.) (Eng.) (“simple to
understand and easy to apply”).
125. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 265.
126. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 335 (Can.); O’Brien,
supra note 77, at 967.
127. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028–29 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[The
rule] operates as a rule of law and allows a court to adjudicate rather than manage.”).
128. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 278, 284.
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certainty may be relevant but not decisive: it must be weighed against
other relevant factors. A less certain set of rules may be warranted if it
yields fairer or more efficient outcomes. It is thus highly doubtful that
certainty can justify a blanket exclusion of recovery for all relational
losses.
b.

The Commercial Fishermen’s Exception

Relational economic losses are generally irrecoverable under Robins
Dry Dock.129 This common law rule, when applied to marine pollution,
has a single well-defined exception. Courts have consistently allowed
commercial fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, etc., to recover for lost
fishing profits following a tortious diminution of aquatic life. The
exception originated in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,130 in the wake of the
Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969.131 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the exclusionary rule,132 but relied on existing exceptions
to conclude that precedent did not foreclose examination of commercial
fishermen’s claims against the polluter on their merits.133 The court
explained that the chief element in determining whether a defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff was the foreseeability of the risk, and
that the defendants in this case undoubtedly realized that negligence on
their part might result in a substantial oil spill that would diminish
aquatic life and injure commercial fishermen.134 It opined that the direct
causal link between the impact of escaping oil on aquatic life and
plaintiffs’ losses, public disapproval of environmental harm, the policy
of preventing such harm, and the fact that the oil company was the
cheapest cost avoider, also pointed to the existence of a duty of care.135
Yet the court took pains to emphasize that its holding “does not open the
door to claims that may be asserted by those, other than commercial
fishermen, whose economic or personal affairs were discommoded by
the oil spill.”136 Thus, recovery for pollution-related economic harms is

129. See, e.g., Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1021, 1028–29.
130. 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
131. See ROBERT O. EASTON, BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1972).
132. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 563–64.
133. Id. at 565–68.
134. Id. at 568–69.
135. Id. at 569–70.
136. Id. at 570.
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strictly limited to commercial marine harvesters.137 Moreover, the
exception does not apply to fishermen who engage in commercial
fishing without licenses required by the state.138
According to the prevailing view, the fishermen’s exception is based
on unique environmental concerns.139 Several judges have even
suggested that this is not a genuine exception because fishermen have a
constructive “proprietary interest in fish in waters they normally
harvest,” making their loss equivalent to property damage rather than
purely economic.140 At any rate, this exception is well established. More
than a decade after Oppen, the Fifth Circuit upheld the general rule of no
recovery for purely economic losses consequent on marine pollution, but
recognized an exception for commercial fishermen.141
c.

The Exxon Valdez Litigation

Following the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, over 200 lawsuits,
involving more than 30,000 claims, were brought in federal and state
courts.142 Exxon’s liability to commercial fishermen was undisputed.143
In fact, Exxon undertook a voluntary claims program, ultimately paying
out $303 million, principally to fishermen whose livelihoods were
disrupted from 1989 through 1994.144 Moreover, 10,000 commercial
fishermen were allowed to sue in federal court and subsequently
137. Other victims are not entitled to recover. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,
752 F.2d 1019, 1026–29 (5th Cir. 1985).
138. See Blue Gulf Seafood, Inc. v. TransTexas Gas Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 732, 734–35 (S.D.
Tex. 1998); Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 841 F. Supp. 783, 785–86 (S.D. Tex. 1993). The
court in Union Oil made clear that the plaintiffs “lawfully and directly make use of a resource of the
sea . . . in the ordinary course of their business,” implying that the exception does not apply to
unlawful harvesting. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570.
139. See Channel Star Excursions, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 77 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Union Oil is limited to the environmental sphere; if it is under admiralty law, it can only be said to
have carved out a unique exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule by placing a duty on oil drillers to
fish and the marine ecosystem.”).
140. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10; Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D.
Va. 1981). This, of course, is a clear fiction. See McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 82, at 1525–28.
141. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028–29; see also Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 861
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the exception was not affected by E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986), which upheld the Robins Dry Dock rule in a products
liability case); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (allowing fishermen’s
cause of action under a theory of public nuisance); Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216,
1223, 1227 (Fla. 2010) (allowing fishermen’s cause of action in negligence).
142. See Goldberg, supra note 98, at 1.
143. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511, 1518 (D. Alaska 1991); In re Exxon Valdez,
No. A89-0095-V, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *21, *23 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994).
144. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D. Alaska 2004).
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recovered $286.8 million in compensatory damages, based on the market
value of the fish they would have caught but for the spill.145 Note,
however, that even fishermen were allowed to recover only the value of
their lost catch; they were denied recovery for the reduction in value of
their fishing permits146 and for lost profits from other businesses.147
Similarly, there was no dispute that Alaska Natives had a right to
recover economic damages “flowing from loss of fishing resources,” and
their claims for harvest damages were settled.148 Indeed, the fact that the
U.S. Supreme Court allowed fishermen and Alaska Natives to recover
punitive damages indicates that it implicitly acknowledged their standing
to claim compensatory damages.149
In contrast, other claims were generally rejected under the Robins Dry
Dock doctrine. The district court dismissed, inter alia, claims by
providers of goods (such as fishing gear), services (such as maintenance
and repair of fishing boats), and accommodation to commercial
fishermen;150 by businesses that relied on an uninterrupted supply of
seafood by local fishermen, including fish tenderers,151 seafood
wholesalers,152 seafood processors,153 taxidermists,154 and even the
Cordova Air Service;155 and by businesses that relied on the commercial
fishing industry as both consumers and suppliers, such as a business that
produced fishing baits from salmon carcasses.156 The district court also
rejected claims by employees of the above businesses, such as cannery
workers,157 as well as providers of goods and services to these
145. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480 (2008).
146. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5995, at *2–5 (D. Alaska
Mar. 23, 1994).
147. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *23 (a fisherman may recover for lost fishing
income, but not for lost income from distributing fishing gear).
148. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997).
149. See John P. Jones, The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases, 83
TUL. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (2009).
150. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *11–12, *17 (dismissing claims by suppliers
of goods and services to commercial fishermen); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511,
1514 (D. Alaska 1991) (dismissing claims by fishing lodges).
151. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4 (D. Alaska
Jan. 26, 1994); Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1511, 1514.
152. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4.
153. Id. at *3–4; Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514.
154. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *16 (D. Alaska Dec.
23, 1992); Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514.
155. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *16.
156. Id. at *15.
157. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4.
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businesses, including the Kodiak Electric Association, which suffered
reduced power usage by seafood processors,158 and a company selling
refrigeration systems to those associated with the fishing industry.159
The court likewise dismissed claims related to the tourism and leisure
industry, including loss of enjoyment claims by sport fishermen,
photographers, and kayakers,160 and—more importantly—economic loss
claims by guides for sport fishermen and nature lovers,161 boat
charterers,162 and the like. Finally, district courts in Alaska and
California dismissed more tenuous claims brought by scientists who
allegedly lost income from scientific activities, research funding, future
intellectual property, etc., and were unable to capture and sell sea otters
to aquariums and zoos;163 the Old Harbor Native Corporation, which
allegedly lost profit due to congressional disapproval of an exchange of
Native Corporation lands for oil exploration rights in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge following the oil spill;164 and California drivers, who
had to pay higher prices for gasoline following the spill.165
2.

Punitive Damages

a.

The Punitive Damages Doctrine

Punitive damages are sums awarded to tort claimants beyond their
actual harm.166 The idea of non-compensatory damages was known in
ancient legal systems,167 but the modern doctrine of punitive damages
dates back to the mid-eighteenth century. Originating in England,168 the
158. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *15.
159. Exxon Valdez, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *5–6, *16.
160. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (D. Alaska 1991).
161. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *10–11.
162. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514.
163. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *12–14 (“[S]cientists are not fishermen and
otters are not fish which may be lawfully taken and sold.”).
164. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20556, at *5–7 (D. Alaska
Mar. 23, 1994).
165. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. CV-90-2184, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251, at *2 (D. Alaska
July 27, 1990). The Ninth Circuit did not contest the ruling with regard to the maritime tort, and
focused instead on the claim under TAPAA, discussed below. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d
805, 807–08 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. See, e.g., Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due
Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 893 (1991).
167. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming The Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285–86 (1993).
168. See Wilkes v. Wood, [1763] 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P.) (“[A] jury have it in their
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a
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doctrine was soon imported to America.169 A fierce debate over the
legitimacy of punitive damages erupted in the mid-nineteenth century
between Simon Greenleaf and Theodore Sedgwick. Apart from a fierce
controversy about the proper interpretation of the case law,170 Greenleaf
advocated a clear distinction between private and public law,171 insisting
that a plaintiff in tort could not be permitted to vindicate the state’s
interests,172 whereas Sedgwick believed a division between the public
and private interests was “entirely fanciful and imaginary.”173 The U.S.
Supreme Court settled the dispute in Day v. Woodworth,174 holding that
the jury in a tort action could inflict exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages on the defendant based on the enormity of his wrong rather
than the measure of the plaintiff’s harm. The Court opined that despite
past controversy, “repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are
to be received as the best exposition of what the law is . . . .”175
Three points deserve mention. First, since 1818 it has been clear that
punitive damages are available not only in land-based common law but
also under general maritime law.176 Second, by the end of the nineteenth
century, most jurisdictions allowed punitive damages awards not only
against individuals but also against corporations. At that time there was
still some controversy about the availability of the remedy against
corporations liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.177 This
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment.”); Huckle v. Money, [1763] 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 , 769 (K.B.) (introducing the term “exemplary damages”).
169. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784) (allowing “exemplary damages”); see also
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791) (instructing the jury “not to estimate the damages
[according to] actual loss; but to give damages for example’s sake.” (emphasis in original)).
170. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 276–87 n.2 (9th ed. 1863)
(insisting that damages were always compensatory); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 666 (3rd ed. 1858) (contending that courts permitted punitive damages in
exceptional cases); Simon Greenleaf, The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 9 L. REP. 529,
530–38 (1846–47) (insisting that damages were always compensatory).
171. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1299.
172. Greenleaf, supra note 170, at 529–30.
173. SEDGWICK, supra note 170, at 671.
174. 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
175. Id.; see also Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609–10 (1887) (“The right
of the jury in some cases to award exemplary or punitive damages is no longer an open question in
this court.”); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854). But cf. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382,
397 (1872) (holding that punishment is “out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust,
unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies” and that the idea
of punitive damages “is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence,
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.”).
176. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818).
177. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1295–97.

021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete)

26

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 11:09

[Vol. 86:1

controversy remains unsettled.178 Third, while punitive damages were
originally awarded in cases of malicious and mean-spirited conduct, the
doctrine has been gradually expanded to cases of recklessness and even
gross negligence.179 These three developments laid the foundations for
the punitive damages award in the Exxon Valdez case.
In the twentieth century, the punitive damages doctrine was somewhat
restrained. In several states, the plaintiff was required to satisfy a higher
standard of proof, such as “clear and convincing evidence,” to obtain
punitive damages.180 Moreover, in many states, punitive damages were
subject to a statutory cap.181 Finally, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary penalties on a
tortfeasor.182 A punitive damages award is therefore subject to
substantive due process review.
How does a court determine if a punitive damages award is
excessive? In BMW v. Gore,183 the United States Supreme Court held
that in reviewing awards of punitive damages under the Due Process
Clause, courts ought to consider three guideposts.184 The first is the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.185 Factors
relevant in determining the degree of reprehensibility include the type of
harm caused, victims’ vulnerability, defendant’s intentional malice or
reckless disregard for health and safety of others, repetitive misconduct,
and defendant’s efforts to mitigate the harm caused.186 The second

178. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law off Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 63 (1982) (“[some courts] hold that an employer may be liable for punitive damages for
wrongful acts committed by employees in the course of their employment . . . [Others] limit
vicarious punitive damage liability to those situations where wrongful acts were committed or
specifically authorized or ratified by a managerial agent, or were committed by an unfit employee
who was recklessly employed or retained.”).
179. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1305–07; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (punitive damages may be awarded for reckless indifference to the rights of
others); Ellis, supra note 178, at 20.
180. See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True
Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993).
181. See id.
182. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 562 (1996); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55
(1993).
183. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
184. Id. at 575–85.
185. Id. at 575–80.
186. See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1085–89 (9th Cir. 2007).
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guidepost is the disparity between the plaintiff’s actual or potential harm
and the punitive damages award.187 In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,188 the Court held that a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages was more likely to accord
with due process;189 but it emphasized that greater ratios could be
consistent with the Due Process Clause where “a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”190 The
third guidepost is the difference between the punitive damages award
and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.191
One of the most fundamental principles in the modern law of torts is
that damages should restore the victim to the pre-tort condition
(restitutio in integrum).192 Punitive damages are non-compensatory by
definition. So although the specific goals of the punitive damages
doctrine are yet to be explored, it is clearly inconsistent with the
fundamental remedial maxim.193 Just like the exclusionary rule, punitive
damages are an exception that needs to be justified, and if its
justifications cease to exist, the general principle must be reinstated.
In the past it was very frequently said that the aim of punitive
damages was “to punish and deter,”194 but this wording is somewhat
misleading because punishment—as this word is currently understood—
is not a purpose but a mechanism. Punishment may be defined as

187. BMW, 517 U.S. at 580–83.
188. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
189. Id. at 425.
190. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). Perhaps TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443 (1993), is the type of exceptional case envisioned by the State Farm Court: compensatory
damages were $19,000, the defendant acted in a “malicious and fraudulent” manner, and punitive
damages were set at $10 million. Id. at 462
191. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–85.
192. See supra note 27.
193. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 469 n.216 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Tort law is tied to the goal of compensation (punitive damages being the notable
exception) . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 568; Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 275 (1989); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The same language was used in professional and academic
literature. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); Howard A. Denemark,
Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by
a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 935–36 (2002); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive
Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1965). This
language was also used in jury instructions. See RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 98 (3d ed. 1993).
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“imposing a sanction,”195 and may have various goals, such as
retribution, deterrence, appeasement of the victim, incapacitation of the
wrongdoer, and education.196 Saying that punitive damages are meant to
punish is tautological. But the word “punish” has not been used in vain.
Courts and scholars sometimes use the terms “punishment” and
“retribution” interchangeably. Whenever courts say that punitive
damages are supposed to “punish and deter,” they seem to suggest that
punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterrence.197 Recent
American case law and literature use this more accurate terminology.198
Retribution may be defined as imposing a sanction that corresponds to
individual moral desert.199 The wrongdoer deserves to be punished on
account of her wrongful conduct, and ought to be punished fairly
regardless of the consequences of her punishment.200 Retributive justice
does not require that the sanction be identical to the wrong committed; it
merely insists on proportionality between the severity of the sanction
and the gravity of the wrong.201
Again, awarding non-compensatory damages is inconsistent with the
corrective structure of tort law. Therefore, punitive damages are awarded
merely at the margins, where courts feel that a compensatory award is an
extremely lenient sanction in relation to the gravity of the defendant’s

195. Cf. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 51, 52 (1999).
196. See id. (describing various purposes of punishment).
197. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 178, at 1, 4 (observing that the term “punishment” implies
retribution); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 310 (1983) (same).
198. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 474, 492 (2008); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
19 (1991); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 356–
57 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2081 (1998).
199. See Fletcher, supra note 195, at 52 (1999) (“[B]y the use of the . . . term ‘retributive,’ I
simply mean imposing punishment because it is deserved on the basis of having committed a
crime.”).
200. Retributive justice is therefore retrospective, in that it looks backward to the particular
wrongdoing, not forward to the consequences of the sanction.
201. See TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 13, 83–84, 92, 123, 138 (1999); Peter
Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141,
143, 160–61 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—
Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 73, 87 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1690 (1992); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 530–32 (1987).
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conduct.202 In other cases, the discrepancy between the gravity of the
wrong and the severity of the sanction is left untouched for the sake of
corrective justice.203 As observed by the United States Supreme Court:
It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for her or
his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages
should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after
having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to
warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve retribution
or deterrence.204
Now egregious conduct may give rise to various types of sanctions,
both legal (criminal, administrative, civil, or disciplinary) and extra-legal
(such as reputational harm). To avoid disproportion between the overall
burden imposed on the defendant and the gravity of the wrong, these
sanctions must be taken into account in deciding whether punitive
damages may be awarded in a specific case, and in determining their
amount. Some jurisdictions have barred punitive damages in a civil
action following or pending criminal conviction for the same conduct.205
However, the prevailing view in the United States is that criminal
conviction does not bar punitive damages, although it should be taken
into account in determining the extent of the award.206
Deterrence is the second dominant justification for punitive
damages.207 The additional sanction may serve to deter the specific
defendant from repeating the wrong and others from committing similar
wrongs.208 Two questions arise in this respect. First, what types of
wrongfulness do punitive damages aim to deter? The simplistic answer,
following the Benthamite tradition, conflates the end and the means.
Deterrence is such an integral and distinctive feature of utilitarian and
economic theories of law that a sanction must deter inefficient conduct.
But American courts seem to have a somewhat different intuition. For
202. See, e.g., David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 364
(1998).
203. Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts, 73 TENN. L. REV.
177, 228 (2006).
204. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
205. See Walther & Plein, supra note 194, at 384.
206. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991); In re Exxon Valdez, 270
F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979);
Annotation, Assault: Criminal Liability as Barring or Mitigating Recovery of Punitive Damages, 98
A.L.R. 3d 870 (1980).
207. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
208. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 3.
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instance, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.209
the U.S. Supreme Court opined that the deterrent function of punitive
damages was not exclusively efficiency-oriented: “Citizens and
legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in
economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally
offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct.”210
The second question is why deterrence of unwarranted conduct
requires extra-compensatory damages. After all, ordinary compensatory
damages already serve to deter.211 Modern theorists have proposed three
answers. First, compensatory damages are insufficient if the wrongdoer
might escape liability for the wrongful conduct.212 Efficient deterrence
entails internalization of the harm caused by wrongful conduct to the
extent that such harm reflects true social cost. However, there is a series
of factors—external to substantive tort law—that let many wrongdoers
off scot-free. Punitive damages may be used to overcome problems of
under-enforcement.213 Under this perception, total damages should be
the actual harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the
defendant will be found liable when she should be found liable; punitive
damages would then consist of the excess of total damages over
compensatory damages.214 Indeed, courts have deemed heavier punitive
awards justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing
chances of getting away with it),215 or when the harm and the
corresponding compensatory award are small (providing low incentive
to sue).216 Second, compensatory damages might not provide a sufficient
incentive if the wrongdoer derives morally illicit gains—financial or
non-financial—from the wrongful conduct.217 Third, compensatory

209. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
210. Id. at 439–40.
211. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 7; Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982).
212. See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 98, at 160–65, 184–85, 223–24; SHAVELL, supra
note 84, at 148; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873–74 (1998); Sharkey, supra note 198, at 365–68; Sunstein et al., supra
note 198, at 2075, 2082.
213. See supra note 212.
214. For further discussion of this rationale, see supra note 211.
215. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
216. Id.
217. See Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989) (“If the wrongful conduct
was profitable to the defendant, the punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in
excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss.”); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis
of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 79, 98 (1982) (“[P]unitive damages should be
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damages might not suffice if some of the actual harm caused by
wrongful conduct is legally non-compensable.218 I have critically
assessed these arguments elsewhere.219
b.

The Exxon Valdez Litigation

The United States Supreme Court ruling on punitive damages in the
Exxon Valdez case arose from commercial fishermen’s and Alaska
Natives’ actions against Exxon. The factual basis for the punitive
damages award was simple. The Exxon Valdez captain, a relapsed
alcoholic, had consumed enough alcohol to incapacitate a non-alcoholic
shortly before boarding the vessel and inexplicably exited the bridge
during a critical maneuver, leaving a tricky course correction to
unlicensed subordinates.220 Although the captain’s superiors knew he
had completed an alcohol treatment program, it was unclear whether
they also knew about his relapse.221 On trial, the jury found Exxon
reckless (hence potentially liable for punitive damages) under
instructions providing that a corporation is responsible for the reckless
acts of employees acting in a managerial capacity in the scope of their
employment.222 Thereafter, in 1994, the jury awarded $287 million in
compensatory damages to commercial fishermen (from which prior
voluntary payments were deducted).223 The jury also awarded $5000 in
punitive damages against the captain and $5 billion against Exxon.224
For more than a decade the issue went back and forth between the
district court and the court of appeals,225 until the latter remitted the

computed at a level that offsets the illicit pleasure of noncompliance or the exceptional costs of
compliance that motivated the injurer.”).
218. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 28.
219. Perry, The Exxon Valdez, supra note 20, at 30–32.
220. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 477–78 (2008).
221. Id. at 476–77.
222. Id. at 480.
223. Id. at 480–81.
224. Id. at 481.
225. These are the relevant decisions in chronological order: In re Exxon Valdez, 1995 Am. Mar.
Cases 1956 (D. Alaska 1995); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236, 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002) (reducing the punitive
award to $4 billion); Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 30-35166, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18219, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110
(D. Alaska 2004) (increasing the award to $4.5 billion).
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punitive damages award to $2.5 billion.226 Exxon appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
On its appeal, Exxon raised three arguments. Its first argument was
that it was an error to instruct the jury that a corporation was responsible
for the reckless acts of employees in a managerial capacity while acting
in the scope of their employment.227 Put differently, a court cannot
award punitive damages under maritime law against shipowners for
actions by underlings not “directed,” “countenanced,” or “participated
in” by the owners.228 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that
maritime law should conform to land-based common law, in which
punitive damages can be awarded against a principal because of an act
by an agent where “the agent was employed in a managerial capacity
and was acting in the scope of employment.”229 The Court was equally
divided on this question, and therefore left the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
undisturbed without setting a precedent on this matter.230
Exxon’s second argument was that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA)231 preempted the maritime law remedy of
punitive damages.232 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding that there was no clear indication of congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, and that punitive damages
for private harms would have no frustrating effect on the FWPCA’s
remedial scheme.233
Exxon’s last argument was that the $2.5 billion punitive damages
award exceeded the bounds justified by the underlying goals of this
remedy.234 The Court reiterated the view that punitive damages are
aimed at retribution and deterrence, and limited to cases of “enormity,”
in which a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence,
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference to others’ rights, or even more
deplorable behavior.235 The Court observed that in recent decades the
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards had remained less than
226. Baker v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 490 F.3d 1066, 1073, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Exxon
Mobile Corp., 472 F.3d 600, 602, 625 (9th Cir. 2006).
227. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 482 (2008).
228. Id. at 483 (quoting The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558–59 (1818)).
229. Id. at 484. The rule is set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1979).
230. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484.
231. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
232. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484–86.
233. Id. at 488–89.
234. Id. at 489–90.
235. Id. at 492–93.
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1:1, and that there has been no marked increase in the percentage of
cases with punitive awards.236 It opined, however, that the
unpredictability of high punitive awards was in tension with their
punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries.237 A penalty should be
reasonably predictable in its severity, to enable every person to know
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action over another; and a
penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair probability of
suffering in like degree for like damage.238 The Court concluded that
awards at or below the empirically established median would roughly
express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases like the case at bar,
which have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness (such as malice
or avarice), and raise no unique obstacles to enforcement (such as a
modest harm or low likelihood of detection). Accordingly, and given the
need for predictability, the Court held that a 1:1 ratio was a fair upper
limit in such maritime cases, therefore reducing the punitive damages
award to $507.5 million.239 Cases in which the defendant’s conduct is
more egregious than reckless are not so limited.240
B.

Federal Legislation

Prior to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act, oil spills were
governed by a patchwork of federal legislation. Section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899241 provides that it is unlawful to discharge or
cause a discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind” into any navigable
water of the United States. Courts have consistently held, however, that
this section does not confer a private cause of action on victims of
discharge.242 The FWCPA provided recovery for government cleanup
and restoration costs, but did not address private losses.243 Section 311 of
this Act prohibits “[t]he discharge of oil or hazardous substances. . . in

236. Id. at 497–99.
237. Id. at 500–03.
238. Id. at 502–03.
239. Id. at 512–15.
240. See Jones, supra note 149, at 1302.
241. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
242. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985);
Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1011–12 (4th Cir. 1979); Yates v. Island
Creek Coal Co., 485 F. Supp. 995, 996–97 (W.D. Va. 1980); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 373 F. Supp.
839, 844–45 (D. Me. 1974).
243. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 327; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1344–45.
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such quantities as may be harmful” to U.S. controlled waters,244 and
provides for administrative and civil penalties for various violations.245
But this section also does not allow recovery for harm caused to private
entities.246
Three statutes addressed oil pollution liability and compensation, but
only with regard to incidents related to specific ventures. The first was
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA),247 invoked by
many claimants in the Exxon Valdez case. The Act imposed strict
liability for damages resulting from marine pollutions, apparently
without the Robins Dry Dock limit;248 yet its scope was very limited.
First, it applied only to oil pollution, not to the release of other
hazardous substances.249 Second, it only covered incidents related to the
operation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.250 Third, it granted a
cause of action only against certain classes of polluters, namely owners
and operators of vessels onto which oil transported through the TransAlaska pipeline was loaded at the pipeline’s terminal facilities.251
Finally, the TAPAA set rigid liability caps. In the case of a discharge
from a vessel, liability could not exceed $100 million, of which the
owner and operator of the vessel were liable for the first $14 million, and
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund was liable for the balance.252

244. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006).
245. Id. § 1321(b)(6)–(7).
246. See, e.g., Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (E.D. La.
1993); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 982 (E.D. Va. 1981).
247. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2006).
248. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *13 (D. Alaska Dec.
23, 1992); Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 858–60 (C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Exxon Valdez,
767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Alaska 1991); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (D. Alaska
1990). But cf. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. 90-2184, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251, at *2–3 (C.D.
Cal. July 27, 1990) (holding that Robins Dry Dock applies to claims under TAPAA). On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision without directly discussing the applicability of
Robins Dry Dock. It held that plaintiffs’ losses were “remote and derivative” and fell “outside the
zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it passed TAPAA.” Benefiel v.
Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also David P. Lewis, Note, The Limits of
Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure Economic Loss?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 87, 116–
30 (1993) (supporting the district court’s position).
249. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (2006).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 1653(c)(3). The pipeline operator “collect[s] from the owner of the oil . . . a fee of five
cents per barrel,” and the collection ceases upon the accumulation of $100 million. Id. § 1653(c)(5).
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Robins Dry Dock applied to any damages in excess of the $100 million
recoverable under the TAPAA.253
Similarly, the Deepwater Port Act (DPA) imposed strict but limited
liability for removal costs and damages that resulted from a discharge of
oil from deepwater ports or vessels proceeding to or from such ports.254
The DPA also established a fund that was available for compensation in
excess of the statutory cap, originally up to $100 million.255 Lastly, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended in 1978,
applied to discharges from offshore facilities on the outer continental
shelf and from vessels carrying oil from these facilities.256 The OCSLA
imposed strict liability on the owner and operator of the offshore facility
or the vessel, subject to statutory caps, and established the Offshore Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund that covered losses not otherwise
compensated up to $200 million. Although cases like the Deepwater
Horizon, which occurred on the outer continental shelf, would have been
governed by the OCSLA prior to 1990,257 the liability sections of this
Act—like those of the DPA—were repealed by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990.258
C.

State Law

Apart from common law remedies, most coastal states and the five
Great Lakes states have enacted water pollution legislation with strict
liability provisions.259 The main question was whether oil pollution
victims could pursue claims under state law, in particular where such
claims did not conform to federal maritime law.
For instance, in an attempt to circumvent the harsh implications of
Robins Dry Dock in the Exxon Valdez case, many claims were brought
under the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act,260 which imposes

253. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; see also Exxon Valdez, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495,
at *12–13.
254. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2006); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 328–29.
255. This amount was reduced by the Deepwater Port Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98419, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 1607, 1608–09 (1984).
256. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1824 (2006); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 329–30.
257. “Outer Continental Shelf” includes “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the
area of lands beneath navigable waters [under state jurisdiction], and of which the subsoil and
seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (2006).
258. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, §§ 2003–2004, 8102 104 Stat. 507, §§ 2003–2004, 8102 (1990).
259. See, e.g., Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 10–11.
260. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822–.824 (2006).
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strict liability for damages, including economic losses, caused by
unauthorized release of hazardous substances. A controversy emerged
regarding the possible preemption of this provision by general maritime
law. Under Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,261 state legislation may
incidentally affect maritime affairs, unless it “contravenes the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to
the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and
interstate relations.”262 The federal district court in Alaska held that
Robins Dry Dock applied to claims brought against Exxon under the Act,
because state law may not conflict with federal maritime law.263 Other
courts interpreting comparable legislation in other states in the late
1980s and early 1990s, including the Fifth Circuit, reached similar
conclusions.264
However, both the Alaska Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit on
appeal from the District Court of Alaska, decided that Robins Dry Dock
did not preempt liability for purely economic loss under state law,265 and
this seems to be the dominant view today.266 According to this stance,

261. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
262. Id. at 216; see also Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 339 (1973).
263. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *5–7 (D. Alaska
Jan. 26, 1994); In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *17–20 (D.
Alaska Dec. 23, 1992); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16 (D. Alaska 1991). More
accurately, the district court held that Robins Dry Dock applied to claims under the Alaska Act
against entities not liable under the TAPAA, and to claims against entities liable under the TAPAA
in excess of the TAPAA cap. Because the vessel owner and operator are liable for only $14 million
under the TAPAA, damages claimed against the vessel-interest-defendants in excess of $14 million
were subject to Robins Dry Dock. In re Glacier Bay, 865 F. Supp. 629, 637 (D. Alaska 1991).
264. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“[F]ederal interest in protecting maritime commerce is often best served by the establishment of
uniform rules of conduct . . . The Robins rule has proved to be a workable and useful tool in our
maritime jurisprudence. To permit recovery here on state law grounds would undermine the
principles we seek to preserve today.”). The Fifth Circuit reiterated this stance in a slightly different
context in IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee S.S., 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993). See also In re
Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F. Supp. 359, 364–66, 368–69 (D.R.I. 1993) (interpreting R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 46-12.3-4 (1991)); In re Oriental Republic Uru., 821 F. Supp. 950, 955–56 (D. Del. 1993)
(discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6207 (1991)).
265. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2001); Kodiak Island Borough v.
Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 767–69 (Alaska 1999).
266. See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
the Rhode Island Act is not preempted by the admiralty clause); Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F.
Supp. 853, 864–65 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that state law claims that go beyond Robins are not
preempted); cf. In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 900 F. Supp. 697, 702–05 (D.N.J. 1995)
(holding that maritime law does not preempt New Jersey’s common law, which does not
automatically deny recovery for purely economic loss).
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Robins Dry Dock is not a “characteristic feature” of maritime law
because it neither originated nor has exclusive application in maritime
law.267 Moreover, to determine whether state law “interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity” of maritime law, a court needs to apply
a balancing test that weighs state and federal interests on a case-by-case
basis.268 The balance in this case tips in favor of the state: “Alaska’s
strong interest in protecting its waters and providing remedies for
damages resulting from oil spills outweighs the diminished federal
interest in achieving interstate harmony through the uniform application
of Robins.”269 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s rulings on this issue, and remanded the case for reconsideration
of several economic loss claims under Alaska law.270 Following this
decision, Exxon apparently settled these claims.271 Still, as in the case of
the TAPAA, recovery for economic losses hinged on the intricacies of a
special legislative scheme.
II.

THE GENERAL PROBLEM: SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES DOCTRINE

This Part explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to
incongruity on the justificatory level. Part II.A shows that simultaneous
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine
pulls the limits of civil liability in opposing directions. Each seems to
negate at least some of the warranted effects of the other, and applying
the two in a single case futilely violates general principles of tort law
and generates distributive injustice. Part II.B delineates the contours of
the problem, showing that although it surfaced in a marine oil pollution
setting, it is essentially a general weakness of maritime and land-based
common law. Part II.C proposes a conceptual framework for resolution.
The main idea is that where liability must be expanded beyond the limits
set by the exclusionary rule to obtain certain levels of deterrence and
retribution, relaxing the exclusionary rule and allowing more victims to
recover is more defensible than awarding punitive damages to a very
few successful claimants.
267. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251; Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 767.
268. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251.
269. Id. at 1252–53; Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 769.
270. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1253.
271. See, e.g., Sea Hawk Seafoods v. Exxon Corp., 484 F.3d 1098, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that a claim brought by a seafood processor under Alaska law was settled).
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The Adverse Consequences of Simultaneous Application

Liability for purely economic loss and punitive damages were treated
as distinct legal matters throughout the Exxon Valdez litigation, and this
is indisputably correct from a purely doctrinal perspective. However, the
two matters are interlinked on a deeper level. To understand the essence
of the problem, let us assume first that the exclusionary rule sets a
justifiable limit on liability. The main purpose of this rule is to address
the specter of indeterminate and potentially enormous liability. The fear
of overwhelming the court system with numerous claims proved
exaggerated in the Exxon Valdez litigation, where the use of procedural
methods, such as consolidation of actions, alleviated the judicial burden
to a practicable level.272 Although the Court rejected many claims,
thousands of claims were handled quite efficiently. Still, the likelihood
of extensive liability, correlated with the prospect of numerous claims, is
troubling for various reasons. Most importantly, extensive liability may
give rise to an abominable disproportion between the severity of the
sanction and the gravity of the wrong; unduly restrict the freedom of
action of potential tortfeasors; crush productive businesses; and make
liability insurance not worthwhile to insurers and potential injurers alike.
However, if the exclusionary rule reduces liability to a normatively
defensible level, an award of punitive damages necessarily increases the
extent of liability beyond that level.273 And if in certain types of cases an
expansion is justified, how can liability for economic loss still be denied
on the grounds of the need to reduce liability?
Two arguments relating to defendants’ limited funds require special
attention. First, given the limited pool that all successful claimants
ultimately need to share, liability for relational losses may prevent full
recovery for injuries to physical interests, which may be more worthy of
legal protection. Second, each victim may end up with compensation for
a very small fraction of his or her loss, making the costly process futile.
Both arguments assume that allowing recovery for economic losses
would extend liability beyond the defendant’s capacity. But if the
exclusionary rule sets the appropriate limit, an award of punitive
damages generates a similar problem. Assume, for the sake of argument,
that under the exclusionary rule liability perfectly matches the
defendant’s capacity. In this case, an award of punitive damages to all
272. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008) (“The remaining civil
cases were consolidated into this one against Exxon . . . .”).
273. For example, if the exclusionary rule makes liability insurance more readily available,
punitive damages (if covered by liability insurance) may reinstate the problem.
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successful claimants will be futile and wasteful in terms of
administrative costs, because it will not change the ultimate payment to
each claimant. An award of punitive damages to some of the successful
claimants will result in under-compensation of the others.
Another aspect of the ripple effect of economic losses is that the
extent of potential liability is uncertain, leaving potential injurers
incapable of preparing for contingencies. The exclusionary rule is said to
eliminate most of this uncertainty. Yet an award of punitive damages,
subject only to general constitutional guideposts, reinstates a high degree
of uncertainty into the system, as the U.S. Supreme Court in the Exxon
Valdez case observed.274 Potential injurers cannot accurately predict the
extent of compensatory damages, which serve as a benchmark for
punitive damages, or the ultimate ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages. The 1:1 ratio, which reduces uncertainty to
some extent, applies only in maritime law, and even there it may be
relaxed in certain circumstances.
The conventional economic justification for Robins Dry Dock is that
many financial losses are not true social costs. Thus, exclusion of
liability prevents over-internalization, hence over-deterrence.275 But,
again, if limiting liability is required to prevent over-deterrence, an
award of punitive damages increases the extent of liability beyond the
normatively defensible level. And if in certain types of cases an
expansion is nonetheless justified, there is no reason to prefer a noncompensatory sanction to compensation for actual losses. An economic
theorist might argue that each of the two rules deals with a different
problem: the exclusionary rule prevents internalization of private losses
that do not correspond to social costs, and punitive damages are used to
overcome problems of under-enforcement. These two problems entail
independent modifications of the extent of liability, so the simultaneous
application of the two rules is justified. Because this appears to be a
general challenge to my thesis, I discuss it at length below.
Another deterrence-based justification for the exclusionary rule turns
on the fact that the injurer is already liable for the physical injury. The
marginal deterrent effect obtained from holding the injurer liable for
relational economic losses is said to be lower than the administrative
cost involved in shifting the additional loss.276 In cases like the Exxon
Valdez, liability for harm to natural resources, property damage, and

274. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 499–500, 502.
275. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
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marine harvesters’ economic losses (under the fishermen’s exception),
together with criminal fines, might provide sufficient deterrence. If so,
awarding punitive damages may not be cost-justified. Although the cost
of assessing punitive damages in a particular case is probably lower than
the cost of handling additional claims, the administrative cost is still
significant, as illustrated by the Exxon Valdez litigation,277 and may
outweigh the benefit in terms of marginal deterrence. Again, if in certain
cases an expansion of liability is necessary to achieve the twin goals of
retribution and deterrence, the justification for denying recovery for
economic losses no longer applies.
Many contend that the typical relational victim could protect his or
her interests through a contract with the primary victim, and that failing
to do so justifies exclusion of liability. I have demonstrated the
weaknesses of this argument elsewhere.278 In particular, protection
through contract is frequently impractical. Marine pollution cases
provide a clear example of impracticability, because oceanic resources
have no owner with whom potential victims can bargain. So even if the
contractual protection argument is valid in other contexts, it is generally
irrelevant here.
A related explanation for the exclusionary rule is the need to
incentivize victims to take precautions and to mitigate damages.
Admittedly, an award of punitive damages does not fully cancel out this
benefit, because punitive damages can be awarded only to those who
have a valid cause of action, and relational victims have none. However,
incentivizing potential victims is a relatively weak and uncommon
justification for the exclusionary rule, because the doctrines of
comparative negligence and mitigation of damages can provide the
necessary incentives. In any case, losses attributable to the victim’s
imprudence, before or after the accident, are not social costs externalized
by the injurer. So denying recovery for such losses not only provides an
incentive to potential victims, but also prevents over-deterrence of
potential injurers. Awarding punitive damages under these
circumstances once again adds a deterrent beyond the warranted level.

277. First, the jury needed to consider whether Exxon was reckless, hence potentially liable for
punitive damages. Baker, 554 U.S. at 479–80. Second, the jury had to determine the proper amount
of punitive damages. Id. at 480. These steps have a price. Moreover, the two judgments may be
challenged in appellate courts. In fact, the question of the proper amount in the Exxon Valdez case
went back and forth between the district court and the court of appeals and was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court nearly fifteen years after the initial judgment.
278. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the exclusionary rule is said to provide a certain and easily
applicable limitation on tort liability. I have opined that liability should
be limited in a just and principled manner, not through arbitrary bright
lines.279 But even if simplicity were a valid justification for blanket
exclusion of liability, the benefit would once again be counterbalanced
by an award of punitive damages. The U.S. Supreme Court explained
that the real problem with punitive damages is the stark unpredictability
of the awards; while the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards falls within a reasonable zone, the variance is quite high.280
Although the Court set an upper limit to this ratio in cases of
recklessness tried under maritime law, it left a relatively high degree of
uncertainty in cases of more reprehensible conduct, as well as in landbased common law. The common law, despite constitutional constraints,
is incapable of eliminating the uncertainty associated with punitive
damages.
Now let us look at the other side of the coin. Punitive damages aim to
increase liability to a normatively desirable degree. They are awarded
where courts feel that a compensatory award is an extremely lenient
sanction with regard to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, or that an
additional extra-compensatory sanction is required to secure the
necessary level of deterrence. If compensation for actual harm is
insufficient to obtain proper levels of retribution and deterrence, it seems
odd that an extra-compensatory supplement intended to increase liability
to a desirable level, namely punitive damages, is accompanied by a
significant reduction in overall liability for actual harm through the
exclusionary rule. If liability should exceed actual harm, denial of
recovery for a substantial portion of the aggregate loss is
counterintuitive, not to say absurd.
In sum, if in a particular case there is good reason to set liability
below actual harm, as the exclusionary rule does, liability should be
limited, and the effects of such limitation should not be canceled out by
a subsequent increase in overall liability. If, on the other hand, there is
good reason to increase liability beyond actual harm, as the punitive
damages doctrine does, liability should increase, and the effects of the
expansion should not be alleviated by wholesale denial of recovery for
some of the actual harm. But what if in the particular case there are
legitimate reasons to reduce liability, along with equally legitimate
reasons to expand liability? The question should then be whether—all

279. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
280. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–500.
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things considered—the scope of liability must equal, exceed, or be less
than actual harm. In the absence of a specific reason to conclude
otherwise, liability must equal actual harm. If liability must fall short of
actual harm, a reasonable limitation of liability is warranted, while
punitive damages are not. If liability must exceed actual harm, punitive
damages are warranted and exclusion of liability for some of the
provable loss is not. Either way, the exclusionary rule and the punitive
damages doctrine should not be applied simultaneously.
As implied above, one may argue that the exclusionary rule and the
punitive damages doctrine are intended to solve separate and
independent problems and entail incommensurable modifications in the
scope of tort liability. Arguably, one set of justifications requires a
certain reduction, while another requires an unequal expansion. Thus,
the two rules should be allowed to apply simultaneously, each in
accordance with its own rationale. A traditional economic version of this
argument might be that the exclusionary rule prevents internalization of
private losses that do not correspond to social costs,281 whereas the
punitive damages doctrine addresses problems of under-enforcement.282
For example, assume that a wrongful conduct causes a $1 million loss to
private entities, of which $100,000 constitutes true social cost, and that
the probability of escaping liability is 0.75. In accordance with the twolayer approach the court should award compensatory damages to the
extent of the social cost, namely $100,000, and subsequently award
$300,000 in punitive damages ($100,000/0.25$100,000) to make up for
cases of impunity.
The answer is simple. The normatively desirable scope of liability
always equals, exceeds, or is less than actual harm. If, considering the
justifications of the exclusionary rule on the one hand, and those of
punitive damages on the other, the court concludes that liability must be
equal to or lower than actual harm, as in the foregoing example,
awarding punitive damages while denying recovery for actual harm is
implausible from conceptual and distributive justice perspectives. Both
the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are exceptions
to general principles of private law. Victims of wrongful conduct should
generally be allowed to recover for their losses, and every victim should
be restored, as much as possible, to the pre-tort condition. If there is
reason to limit liability, it should be done with minimal encroachment on
these fundamental principles. Within the appropriate limit, it is better to

281. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
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allow more victims to recover for their actual loss than to deny such
recovery in violation of the principle of liability for wrongful harm,
while bestowing a windfall on a few claimants in violation of the
principle of restitutio in integrum.283 Besides being conceptually
problematic, the two-layer approach is inferior from a distributive justice
(“fairness”) perspective: if liability is limited, the limited amount should
be distributed according to merit. It is unreasonable to prioritize
enrichment of the already compensated few over compensation to
additional deserving victims. In the numerical example, the law should
endeavor to compensate victims for actual harm up to the desirable
extent of approximately $400,000.284
Similarly, if after considering all relevant factors the court concludes
that total liability must exceed the aggregate loss, all victims should be
compensated for their established losses, and punitive damages should
be awarded in addition. The traditional two-layer approach of the
common law to cases of this sort, namely denying recovery for
economic losses and then awarding punitive damages to successful
claimants, requires an exceptionally large award of punitive damages to
make up for the partial compensation. A smaller amount of punitive
damages would reduce total liability to an undesirable level. Moreover,
because many victims have no standing, the exceptional punitive award
is distributed among relatively few claimants. Thus, instead of allowing
recovery to all victims who incurred real harm and keeping the average
windfall modest, the law bestows a substantial windfall on a very few
claimants, while leaving many victims with nothing.
B.

The Scope of the Problem

I have shown that the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages
doctrine were applied in tandem in the Exxon Valdez litigation, and
explained why this was problematic. In this subpart I demarcate the
boundaries of the problem. First, I extract the precondition of in tandem
application of the two rules from the Exxon Valdez case itself. Then I
examine whether and to what extent the problem identified here
transcends the unique setting of massive maritime pollution.

283. Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to someone who has already been fully
compensated. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59, 87 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284. Of course, we need to decide who will ultimately share this amount. I provide some
guidelines in Part II.C., infra, understanding that courts will have to work out the details on a caseby-case basis.
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With regard to the precondition, the Exxon Valdez litigation is
illustrative. The exclusionary rule applies only when the interference
with the plaintiff’s economic relation is unintentional.285 Traditionally,
punitive damages are awarded when the defendant’s conduct was
outrageous, because his or her acts were done with an evil motive or
with reckless indifference to the rights of others;286 but in some
jurisdictions even gross negligence suffices.287 So application of the two
rules in tandem may occur in cases of recklessness, of which the Exxon
Valdez case is an example, and possibly in cases of extreme
negligence.288 The problem does not arise in cases of ordinary
negligence, where punitive damages are currently precluded.289
Intentional conduct, on the other hand, can yield simultaneous
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine,
even though the former does not apply to intentional interference with
economic relations. This is so because a mean-spirited tort to the person
or property of one person may unintentionally cause economic loss to
others who are economically dependent on the intended victim. In these
cases, the unintended relational losses will be irrecoverable under Robins
Dry Dock, while punitive damages may be deemed appropriate due to
the gravity of the wrong.
The incoherence transcends the unique setting of a massive maritime
pollution. First and foremost, it is not limited to maritime law. As
explained in Part I, both rules are well-established not only in maritime
law, but also in land-based common law.290 They may collide in similar
circumstances in nearly all jurisdictions. There are, of course, numerous
nuances. For instance, punitive damages may be capped in some states,
and caps may vary.291 Similarly, some courts may recognize exceptions
to the exclusionary rule, and these exceptions may also vary from one

285. Intentional interference is actionable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766–766B
(1979).
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
287. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W.Va. 1992);
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1305–07.
288. Recklessness is a conscious choice of action, either with knowledge of serious danger to
others or with knowledge of facts that would disclose the danger to any reasonable person; gross
negligence is a significant deviation from the objective standard of reasonable care. See Ellis, supra
note 178, at 21.
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979).
290. See supra notes 60, 63, 176 and accompanying text.
291. See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1297, 1338–49 (2005).
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jurisdiction to another.292 But the clash between the two rules may
surface in almost all states.293 In fact, the problem might be even more
acute under state law, where juries often have more discretion regarding
the size of punitive damages awards, making them more unpredictable.
This works against the exclusionary rule in terms of promoting certainty.
Moreover, the problem is not limited to environmental disasters. It
was not noticed until a very salient event occurred and high-profile
litigation ensued, but it may arise whenever unintended economic losses
ripple out from a physical injury caused by intentional, reckless or—in
some jurisdictions—grossly negligent conduct. For example, suppose
that picketers recklessly injure a generator or a cable that supplies
electricity to an industrial zone. The factories in the area will not be
allowed to claim damages for their unintended economic losses.294 But
the injurers’ recklessness may be a sufficient ground for awarding
punitive damages. The picketers’ liability will be simultaneously limited
by the exclusionary rule, and expanded by the punitive damages
doctrine. Similarly, assume that a vehicle driven recklessly by an
intoxicated driver collides with a bridge, thereby blocking the highway
over the bridge and the navigable waterway under it, causing economic
loss to thousands. Drivers and ship owners will not be able to recover for
these losses,295 but the gravity of the wrong might enable the bridge
owner to claim punitive damages, in addition to compensation for
property damage.
Arguably, the problem of contradictory adjustments of the extent of
liability was ultimately evaded in the Exxon Valdez case. The Ninth
Circuit found that the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act was not
preempted by Robins Dry Dock,296 enabling at least some of the
relational victims to claim damages. This does not undermine my thesis.
First, the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act is an esoteric state
statute of limited application. It seemingly solves the problem in a
specific type of events (unauthorized release of hazardous substances)
that take place in a limited geographical area. The problem may still
292. See Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 779.
293. However, Nebraska does not allow punitive damages at all. Distinctive Printing &
Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989).
294. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1980); Byrd v.
English, 43 S.E. 419, 421 (Ga. 1903).
295. See, e.g., Channel Star Excursions, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 77 F.3d 1135, 1137–38 (9th
Cir. 1996); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51–53 (1st Cir. 1985); Akron Corp.
v. M/T Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d
34, 35 (11th Cir. 1982); Kinsman Transit Co. v. Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 821–22 (2nd Cir. 1968).
296. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2001).
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arise in other types of cases and in other jurisdictions. Second, the Ninth
Circuit neither recognized the problem nor endeavored to resolve it. Its
decision focused on the proper interpretation of Jensen concerning
preemption, not on the proper scope of liability in the common law of
torts (maritime or land-based). So it is unclear whether the ultimate
scope of Exxon’s liability was indeed warranted, all relevant factors
being considered. Even if it was, this outcome was haphazard rather than
planned. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in its 2001 decision allowed
claims under the Alaska act,297 but ordered the district court to reduce
the award of punitive damages.298 This would have been consistent with
the normative proposition of this Article if the ultimate scope of liability
had been determined after a conscious and careful consideration of the
various concerns underlying the exclusionary rule and the punitive
damages doctrine.
C.

Guidelines for Resolution

The preceding analysis reveals an awkward phenomenon. Courts may
simultaneously apply rules that pull the bounds of liability in opposite
directions: the exclusionary rule reduces while the punitive damages
doctrine increases liability, both for seemingly legitimate reasons. In
cases of in tandem application, either rule cancels out the effects of the
other, at least to some extent. So far, I have implied that courts need to
determine the proper scope of liability, in accordance with the various
considerations outlined in Part I, and then give the fullest possible effect
to general principles of tort law—liability for wrongful harm and
restitutio in integrum—with the necessary limit in mind. Neither the
exclusionary rule nor the punitive damages doctrine should be applied
separately, without regard to the rationale and effects of the other. In this
subpart, I propose a possible framework for implementing these
conclusions, assuming once again that the justifications for both rules
have merit.
The simplest case is that of ordinary negligence (or non-culpable
conduct) resulting in physical injury and relational economic losses. In
this case, only the rationale for the exclusionary rule is relevant, and
liability should be limited accordingly. But if intentional, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct is involved, the traditional justifications for
punitive damages emerge and call for an expansion of liability. In such a

297. Id.
298. Id. at 1246–47.
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case, the court must first determine the extent of the necessary
expansion.
If the normatively desirable scope of liability is equal to or lower than
the aggregate loss, including relational economic losses, the court should
allow recovery for actual harm incrementally up to the desirable amount,
and preclude punitive damages. As Jane Stapleton observed, British
Commonwealth courts have already recognized that “while the total
extent of economic loss and the total number of victims in an economic
loss case may be indeterminate, this . . . need not be fatal to a claim.”299
There is no legal problem of indeterminacy if the law, on a normatively
justifiable basis, can restrict those who can sue, and this normatively
justified class is reasonably determinate.300 The real question then is
what the normatively justifiable formula for limiting liability should be.
As the expansion of liability is mandated by the underlying rationale of
punitive damages, the formula must comply with this rationale.
Therefore, the limit of liability may reasonably be set according to the
gravity of the defendant’s wrong. The graver the conduct, the more
relational victims are compensated.301 Specifically, any expansion of
liability will enable another sphere of relational victims, whose losses
are more remote from the primary injury, to obtain compensation.302 As
liability for actual losses is expanded to the exact level mandated by the
twin goals of retribution and deterrence, the need for an additional
sanction ceases to exist. Relaxing the exclusionary rule enables the court
to align the scope of compensatory damages with the defendant’s
culpability and makes punitive damages redundant.
As explained, expanding liability for actual harm is better than strict
adherence to the exclusionary rule and a simultaneous award of punitive
damages. The exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are
both exceptions to general principles of private law. If there is reason to
limit liability, it should be done with minimal encroachment on these
principles. The proposed method better serves the principle of liability
299. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 544.
300. Id.
301. The idea that the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct may be relevant in
deciding whether to allow recovery for purely economic loss is not unprecedented. See, e.g., J’Aire
Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979). However, in J’Aire, as opposed to paradigmatic
relational loss cases, there was no physical injury, and the plaintiff was the only one who suffered
economic loss; see also O’Brien, supra note 77, at 969, 972 (concluding based on California case
law that liability for negligent infliction of economic loss is imposed only when the defendant’s
conduct is significantly below that of a reasonable person).
302. Cf. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 544–45 (stating that directness may be the normatively
justifiable basis for expanding liability for economic loss).
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for foreseeable harm caused by unreasonable conduct by allowing more
victims to recover for their actual losses, and better serves the principle
of restitutio in integrum by avoiding extra-compensatory windfalls.
Moreover, it is superior from a distributive justice perspective, as it
prioritizes compensation to more victims over enrichment of the alreadycompensated few.
If the normatively desirable scope of liability exceeds the aggregate
loss, including relational economic losses, the court should allow
recovery by relational victims, and award punitive damages up to the
necessary level. This is preferable to in tandem application of the
exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine. Allowing recovery
to all victims who have incurred real harm, and keeping the average
windfall (in the form of extra-compensatory damages) modest, is better
than bestowing a substantial windfall on a very few victims, while
leaving many others with nothing. Here, too, relaxing the exclusionary
rule would be based on the concept of incremental expansion of liability
according to the gravity of the wrong.303
This proposed reform entails not only modification of substantive
law, but also some procedural adjustments. Most notably, to apply the
new model it is necessary to determine at a relatively early stage if and
to what extent expansion of liability is warranted. Without this
preliminary ruling the court cannot decide whether additional claims for
economic loss should be dismissed or allowed to proceed. In fact, a
preliminary decision of this sort was made in the Exxon Valdez
litigation. The jury was asked to consider whether Exxon was reckless—
hence potentially liable for punitive damages—before making any
decision on compensatory damages.304 A preliminary ruling on the
gravity of the wrong is also necessary under the OPA to determine
whether liability caps apply, as I explain below.
III. OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY IN THE OPA ERA
This Part examines whether the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act
has created a more defensible oil pollution liability regime. Part III.A
presents the current liability regime, using the Deepwater Horizon
incident as a test case. Part III.A.1 systematically analyzes the relevant
provisions of the OPA, including the imposition of strict liability on
specific parties, defenses, recoverable damages, liability caps, and the
303. Liability will be expanded to the exact level mandated by the traditional goals of punitive
damages.
304. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479–80 (2008).
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implications of defendants’ degree of fault. Part III.A.2 discusses the
role of state law within the current scheme. Part III.B acknowledges that
the OPA maintains some correlation between the scope of liability and
the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and that the expansion of liability
in cases of severe misconduct better corresponds to the general
principles of tort law and to distributive concerns. This subpart
demonstrates, however, that the OPA does not set the proper limits on
liability because it is insensitive to the traditional justifications for
exclusion of liability for economic losses on the one hand, and for
expanding liability in the case of severe misconduct on the other hand.
A.

The Current Liability Scheme

1.

The Oil Pollution Act

Congress attempted to enact comprehensive oil pollution legislation
from the mid-1970s, and several bills were introduced and discussed by
the late 1980s.305 Only the Exxon Valdez catastrophe, and a series of
smaller, highly publicized oil spills in subsequent months, galvanized
public and political support for legislative reform.306 The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990307 was approved by the Senate by a vote of 99-0, and by the
House of Representative by a vote of 360-0, and was signed by President
George H.W. Bush on August 18, 1990.308 Because it was enacted in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, the OPA did not apply to any of the
claims arising from that incident. So the highly complex two-decade
litigation that followed the Exxon Valdez spill did not shed much light
on the new statute. Judicial decisions concerning the OPA are sparse, so
the forthcoming Deepwater Horizon litigation may generate an
interesting discussion of various interpretive questions.

305. See OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 3, 195; Elizabeth R. Millard, Anatomy of
an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331,
338–40 (1993); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 338–40; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at
1361–62, 1366–67.
306. Although a series of smaller spills occurred later in 1989 and 1990, the Exxon Valdez
incident was undoubtedly the main catalyst. See Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but
Still Unconstitutional: The Oil Pollution Act’s Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997); Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial
Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.
J. 481, 482 (2000); John H. Cushman, Conferees Agree on Bill to Cover Cost of Oil Spills, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/29/us/conferees-agree-on-bill-to-covercost-of-oil-spills.html.
307. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006) .
308. See Millard, supra note 305, at 368; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 11 n.68.
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The OPA provides that “each responsible party for a vessel or a
facility from which oil is discharged . . . into or upon the navigable
waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable
for the removal costs and damages . . . that result from such incident.”309
The Act clearly applies to the Deepwater Horizon case. The exclusive
economic zone extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. At the
time of the incident, the drilling rig was located at Macondo Prospect,
approximately forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana, well
within the U.S. exclusive economic zone.310 Moreover, the oil spread to
U.S. territorial waters and shorelines.
The Act holds the “responsible party” for a vessel or a facility from
which oil is discharged strictly liable for removal costs and
“damages.”311 In the case of a vessel, the “responsible party” is the
owner, operator, or demise charterer of the vessel; in the case of an
offshore facility, the “responsible party” is “the lessee or permittee of the
area in which the facility is located or the holder of a right of use and
easement granted under applicable State law or the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act . . . for the area in which the facility is located.”312 BP is
clearly a responsible party for the oil spill, as a lessee of the area in
which the Deepwater Horizon was located.313 Technically, BP’s partners
in the Macondo Prospect—Anadarko Petroleum (with a twenty-five
percent working interest) and Mitsui (with a ten percent interest)—may
also be held liable.314 Transocean is also a responsible party, because the
Deepwater Horizon was a “mobile offshore drilling unit” (MODU),
which is not only an offshore facility or a part thereof, but also a
vessel,315 and Transocean was the owner and operator of this vessel.316
309. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
310. The OPA defines “exclusive economic zone” as: “the zone established by Presidential
Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(8). According to the
proclamation “[t]he Exclusive Economic Zone extends to a distance 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/
proclamations/05030.html.
311. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
312. Id. § 2701(32)(C).
313. Id.
314. See John Schwartz, Liability Questions Loom for BP and Ex-Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/25liability.html.
315. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(18), 2704(b) (2006).
316. See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL:
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41262.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, the Coast Guard officially named both BP and
Transocean as “responsible parties” in the incident.317 According to
Transocean officials, the company’s contract with BP obliges the latter
to indemnify the former for the costs and liabilities incurred following
the spill.318 Still, BP has already paid claims and might seek
reimbursement from other parties.
The OPA recognizes three limited defenses to liability. It provides
that a responsible party is not liable for removal costs and damages
where the spill was caused solely by (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war,
or (3) an act or omission of a third party.319 The first two apply in
extremely unusual circumstances. The third (act of a third party) is
narrowed down in two critical respects.320 First, it does not apply where
the third party was an employee, an agent or a person whose conduct
occurs “in connection with any contractual relationship” with the
responsible party.321 At least one court has broadly interpreted the term
“any contractual relationship” to include any commercial contact, even
in the absence of a formal contract.322 So even if the manufacturer of the
blowout preventer used by BP (Cameron International) and the cement
contractor (Halliburton) were negligent,323 and their negligence was the
sole cause of the accident, BP will not be absolved. Second, the third
defense applies only if the responsible party exercised due care with
respect to the oil concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts
of third parties and their foreseeable consequences.324 No defense is
available if the responsible party failed or refused to report the incident,
provide reasonable cooperation and assistance in connection with
cleanup efforts, or comply with orders issued with regard to cleanup.325

317. See Tom Zeller, BP Is in the Spotlight for Now, but 3 Other Companies Could Share the
Blame, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09blame.html.
318. See Schwartz, supra note 314.
319. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
320. Id. § 2703(a)(3).
321. Id.
322. Int’l Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1097, 1105–06 (S.D. Tex.
1994).
323. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/us/29spill.html (“Halliburton officials
knew weeks before the fatal explosion of the BP well in the Gulf of Mexico that the cement mixture
they planned to use to seal the bottom of the well was unstable but still went ahead with the job.”).
The National Commission’s letter is available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/
science/spilldoc.PDF.
324. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) (2006).
325. Id. § 2703(c).
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The responsible party is liable, first, for removal costs incurred by the
United States, a state, or an Indian tribe, and by any person who carries
out cleanup activities in accordance with the National Contingency Plan
prepared and published under the FWPCA.326 The OPA generally limits
a responsible party’s liability for removal costs and damages. For
example, in the case of a discharge from a large double-hull vessel,
liability is limited to the greater of $1900 per gross ton or
$16,000,000.327 But in the case of an oil spill from an offshore facility,
the responsible party’s liability for removal costs (as opposed to
damages) is unlimited.328 The Deepwater Horizon was a MODU—a
vessel and an offshore facility—so the OPA allocates liability as
follows: the MODU’s owner or operator (Transocean) is liable for
removal costs and damages up to the relevant tonnage-based cap, and the
party responsible for the offshore facility (BP and its partners) bears
unlimited liability for removal costs in excess of the MODU’s share.329
In addition to removal costs, the OPA enumerates six categories of
recoverable “damages”:330 (1) harm to natural resources331 (recoverable
by a trustee), namely the cost of restoring or rehabilitating the
environment and the diminution in value of natural resources pending
restoration;332 (2) injury to real or personal property, including
consequential economic loss (recoverable by the owner or lessee of the
property); (3) loss of subsistence use of natural resources; (4) loss of
taxes, royalties, rents, fees or net profit shares (recoverable by the United
States or a state); (5) loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
due to an injury to property or natural resources; (6) costs of providing
public services during or after removal activities. The OPA does not
authorize compensation for personal injuries.
The fifth category of recoverable damages seems to embrace
economic losses caused by an injury to natural resources or to property
not belonging to the plaintiff, namely relational economic losses. But the
OPA does not clarify which classes of claimants are covered by this
provision. The House Conference Report explains that “[t]he claimant
need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover
326. Id. §§ 2701(19), 2702(b)(1).
327. Id. § 2704(a)(1).
328. Id. § 2704(a)(3).
329. Id. § 2704(b).
330. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
331. Id. § 2701(20) (defining natural resources as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources.”).
332. Id. §§ 2702(b)(2)(A), 2706(d).
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for lost profits or income,”333 but provides only a single example: “a
fisherman may recover lost income due to damaged fisheries resources,
even though the fisherman does not own those resources.”334 Alas,
fishermen were entitled to compensation even under pre-OPA maritime
law, as explained at length above.335 The question is whether the OPA
expanded liability beyond the traditional bounds. According to the
conventional view, the OPA completely supersedes Robins Dry Dock,
and allows recovery for purely economic losses resulting from oil
spills,336 although at least one court has held the opposite position.337
But even if the majority view prevails, claimants under the OPA may
be required to satisfy a proximate cause test. In discussing a claim
brought under TAPAA by California drivers who had to pay higher
prices for gasoline following the Exxon Valdez spill, the Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiffs’ losses were “remote and derivative . . . [and] fall
outside the zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect
when it passed TAPAA.”338 Presumably, the OPA will be construed and
applied in a similar manner.339
The question of liability for purely economic losses is likely to arise
in the Deepwater Horizon litigation and out-of-court negotiations. If BP
was grossly negligent, its liability under the OPA will not be limited, as
explained below. Under those circumstances, the scope of liability for
purely economic losses will have a considerable impact on BP’s
condition. If, on the other hand, BP was not grossly negligent, liability
for purely economic losses will dilute the pool available for
compensating traditional tort claimants. Either way, at least one party
will have a clear interest in bringing up the economic loss issue.
333. See supra Part I.A.1.b.
334. H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 103 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
335. Id.
336. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping Co. v.
Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630–31 (1st Cir. 1994); Sekco Energy, Inc.v. M/V Margaret Chouest,
820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014–15 (E.D. La. 1993); Harrington, supra note 306, at 8–13; Kiern, supra
note 306, at 531–32; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 28, at 15; Swanson, supra note 38, at 152–55;
Sturla Olsen, Comment, Recovery for the Lost Use of Water Resources: M/V Testbank on the
Rocks?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 271, 286–88 (1992); Cameron H. Totten, Note, Recovery for Economic
Loss Under Robins Dry Dock and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V
Margaret Chouest, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 167, 171–73, 177 (1993).
337. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 678–79 (E.D. Mich 1992)
(“[§ 2702(b)(2)(E)] allows damages only for ‘loss of profits . . . due to the injury, destruction, or
loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources.’ None of the claimants . . . have
alleged ‘injury, destruction, or loss’ to their property.”).
338. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992).
339. See Olsen, supra note 336, at 287.

021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete)

54

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 11:09

[Vol. 86:1

The party responsible for an offshore facility incident is liable for
“damages” up to a $75 million limit.340 The Deepwater Horizon was a
MODU, so the OPA allocates liability for “damages” as follows: the
MODU’s owner or operator (Transocean) is liable for removal costs and
damages up to a tonnage-based cap, as explained above, and the party
responsible for the offshore facility (BP and its partners) is liable for
damages in excess of the MODU’s share and up to the $75 million cap
(in addition to unlimited liability for removal costs).341 Transocean’s
overall liability for removal costs and damages based on tonnage is
estimated at $65 million,342 leaving BP liable not only for most of the
removal costs, but also for a significant portion of the “damages.”343
Calls have been made to raise liability caps following the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, but retroactive application of such an amendment
seems unlikely.344 In any event, regardless of the statutory cap, BP
agreed to establish a $20 billion escrow account over a three-and-a-halfyear period to satisfy legitimate and objectively verifiable claims
including natural resource damages and state and local response costs.345
The statutory limits do not apply if the incident was caused by gross
negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible party, an agent or
employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a
contractual relationship with the responsible party; or by violation of an
applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by any of
these parties.346 In other words, where punitive damages might be
appropriate under general maritime law due to the severity of the
defendant’s conduct, the OPA responds to the exceptional severity by
removing liability caps. Additionally, the caps do not apply if the
responsible party failed or refused to report the incident, to provide
reasonable cooperation and assistance in cleanup efforts, or to comply
with orders issued with regard to cleanup.347

340. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
341. Id. § 2704(b).
342. See HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 316, at 11.
343. Note that the statutory limit on Transocean’s liability applies to the total of removal costs
and “damages,” so only part of the $65 million will actually cover “damages.” BP will be liable for
“damages” in excess of this part, up to $75 million.
344. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, White House Proposes Bill to Lift Caps on Offshore Oil Spill
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/12/12greenwirewhite-house-proposes-bill-to-lift-caps-on-offs-45047.html.
345. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-521, at 6 (2010).
346. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006).
347. Id. § 2704(c)(2).
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The ultimate determinations of fact in the Deepwater Horizon case
may be difficult to predict, but preliminary investigation indicates that a
claim of gross negligence may arise.348 For instance, newspaper reports
indicate that several days before the explosion, BP officials chose, partly
for financial reasons, to use a type of casing for the well that the
company knew was the riskier of two options.349 Allegedly, the blowout
preventer (BOP) was not properly tested even though it was leaking on
at least three occasions.350 Moreover, while it was known that the blind
shear ram—a BOP component that cuts off an uncontrollable well—
might fail, especially at considerable depths, neither Transocean nor BP
took steps to outfit the Deepwater Horizon’s blowout preventer with a
second blind shear ram.351 Furthermore, the BOP did not have a remotecontrol shut-off switch (“acoustic switch”), a last-resort protection
mechanism; it is not required by U.S. regulators, but is mandatory in
Brazil and Norway, and is used by other major oil companies even
where not mandatory.352 At an investigative hearing conducted by the
Coast Guard, a BP official testified that in the days before the explosion,
BP continued drilling for oil “despite internal reports of a leak on a
critical safety device on the rig.”353 An interim report of a team of
experts commissioned by Interior Secretary Kenneth Salazar concluded,
inter alia, that “[n]umerous decisions to proceed . . . despite indications
of hazard, such as the results of repeated negative-pressure tests, suggest
an insufficient consideration of risk and a lack of operating
discipline . . . . The net effect of these decisions was to reduce the
available margins of safety . . . .”354
The OPA responds to gross negligence by removing liability caps. On
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held a decade
348. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 314 (quoting the CEO of BP’s partner Anadarko Petroleum,
saying that “BP’s behavior and actions likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct.”).
349. See Ian Urbina, Documents Show Early Worries About Safety of Rig, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/us/30rig.html.
350. See id.
351. See David Barstow et al., Regulators Failed to Address Risks on Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html.
352. See Russell Gold et al., Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423504575212031417936798.html.
353. See Robbie Brown, BP Kept Drilling After Report of Leak, Worker Says, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/us/21hearings.html.
354. DONALD C. WINTER, INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL RIG
BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH EVENTS 3 (Nov. 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/spillreport20101116.pdf. The interim report identified several factors
that precipitated the disaster, including flawed cementing operations, BOP failures, and
unsatisfactory operating management processes. The final report is expected in June 2011.
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ago that punitive damages were not allowed under this Act.355 The court
explained that the OPA set forth a comprehensive list of recoverable
damages and that the absence of punitive damages from the list was a
good indication of Congress’s intention to exclude such damages.356 The
federal district court in Oregon added that the victim’s
“opportunity . . . to overcome [the cap] with a showing of gross
negligence” also pointed to the same congressional intent.357 It noted,
however, that the OPA only applied to property damage and economic
losses, so if an oil spill resulted in personal injury or loss of life, punitive
damages would still be available under general maritime law, unless
preempted by another federal statute.358
Still, assuming that the punitive damages issue has been settled would
be imprudent. The OPA unequivocally states that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act, this Act does not affect admiralty and maritime
law.”359 Punitive damages were not explicitly excluded, so the saving
clause arguably preserves this remedy. Moreover, in Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker,360 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
FWPCA preempted the maritime law doctrine of punitive damages.361
The Court’s reasoning is pertinent. First, it addressed the argument that
“because the saving clause362 [which mentions only liability for property
damage] makes no mention of preserving punitive damages . . . they are
preempted.”363 The Court correctly observed that this type of argument
equally applied to other categories of damages not specifically
mentioned in the FWPCA saving clause, such as personal injuries
resulting from oil spills, and that no one would dare say that recovery for
these injuries was consequently preempted.364 Analogously, the absence
of punitive damages from the list of recoverable damages under the OPA
cannot justify their preemption, because physical injuries are also absent
and clearly not preempted. The Exxon Court subsequently addressed the

355. S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2000).
356. Id. at 65; see also Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001)
(“[T]he OPA has precluded an award of punitive damages under any general maritime or admiralty
law theory for any claim for which the OPA could provide relief.”).
357. Clausen, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34.
358. Id. at 1134.
359. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2006).
360. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
361. Id. at 487–88.
362. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o) (2006).
363. 554 U.S. at 488.
364. Id. at 488–89.
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alternative claim that the FWPCA preempted punitive damages but not
compensatory damages, finding that “nothing in the statutory text points
to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way.”365 Finally, the Court
emphasized that “to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must
speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.”366 The
OPA, just like the FWPCA, does not do so.367
From the victims’ perspective, the OPA liability cap is further
curtailed by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), which
consolidated, enhanced and superseded previously existing oil spill
compensation funds.368 The Fund has several sources of revenue, of
which the largest is a tax collected for every barrel of crude oil received
at U.S. refineries, domestic crude oil used in or exported from the United
States, and petroleum products brought into the United States.369 In
principle, all claims for removal costs or damages must be presented first
to the responsible party.370 This is a prerequisite for a subsequent
lawsuit.371 If the claim is presented and the responsible party denies
liability or the claim is not settled within ninety days, the claimant may
elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or to
present the claim to the Fund.372 The claimant may also present a claim
to the Fund where full compensation from the responsible party is
unavailable.373 But even when the statutory conditions for Fund
payments are met, the Fund does not guarantee full compensation. First,
it can pay up to $1 billion per incident.374 This amount may be sufficient
in the vast majority of cases, but is clearly inadequate in catastrophic
365. Id. at 489.
366. Id.
367. Implying that it does not preclude punitive damages.
368. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(a) (2006).
369. Id. § 4611. This tax is suspended when the fund reaches its statutory liability limit. For other
sources see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2706(f) (2006) (stating that sums recovered by a trustee for an injury
to natural resources and not used “to reimburse or pay costs incurred by the trustee” in accordance
with the OPA, must be deposited in the fund); id. § 2715 (stating that after paying compensation for
removal costs or damages, the Fund is “subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the
[payee] has under any other law”). All amounts held by the Deepwater Port Liability Fund, the
Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, were also
transferred to the Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(5)–(7) (2006).
370. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) (2006).
371. See Russo v. M/V Dubai Star, No. C09-05158, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50967, at *6–8 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 29, 2010); Boca Ciega Hotel v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1512, 1514–15 (M.D.
Fla. 1994); Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 830 F. Supp. 309, 310–11 (E.D. Va. 1993).
372. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c) (2006).
373. Id. at § 2713(d).
374. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006).
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incidents of the Deepwater Horizon magnitude. Second, the billion
dollar fund may be depleted by payments for harm to natural resources
(up to $500 million) and removal costs. This may leave many individual
victims with only a forlorn hope of recovery.
Note that a responsible party may seek reimbursement from the Fund
of amounts it paid in excess of the statutory cap, or full reimbursement
when a complete defense to liability applies.375 If the incident was
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible
party, the cap does not apply, and the responsible party cannot seek
reimbursement from the Fund.376 At any rate, even if BP was not grossly
negligent and can formally assert a claim against the Fund for sums paid
in excess of the cap, it announced that it “will not seek reimbursement
from the U.S. government or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.”377
In sum, the OPA—just like the pre-OPA maritime law—is sensitive
to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, but it addresses this matter
differently. In cases of ordinary negligence or lack of fault, the Act,
unlike general maritime law, allows recovery for purely economic
losses, but sets rigid liability caps, making the oil spill fund available for
the payment of claims in excess of the responsible parties’ liability caps.
In cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct the Act responds in
the following way. First, it eliminates the responsible party’s liability
cap. Second, it does not allow the responsible party to seek any
reimbursement from the Fund. Third, arguably, it does not allow
punitive damages. Put differently, while general maritime law responds
to severe misconduct by allowing a very exclusive group of successful
claimants to obtain extra-compensatory payments, the OPA removes the
statutory limit of the defendant’s liability to a much more inclusive
group of recognized claimants.
A discussion of the interrelation between the OPA and pre-OPA
maritime law is not limited to the availability of punitive damages
against OPA defendants. Other derivatives of the general question are
whether the OPA excludes recovery under general maritime law in
excess of the OPA caps or against non-OPA defendants. In discussing
the interrelation between the TAPAA and general maritime law
following the Exxon Valdez incident, the district court held that general
375. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2708, 2713(b)(1)(B) (2006).
376. The responsible party can assert a claim only if it is entitled to a defense or a limitation of
liability, and in the case of gross negligence liability limitation does not apply; see also id.
§ 2712(b).
377. See Letter from Tony Hayward, CEO, BP, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (May 16, 2010) (on file with author).
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maritime law applied to any sums in excess of the statutory caps, and to
any defendants not covered by the statute.378 The OPA seems even
clearer on this matter. As explained above, it states that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this Act, this Act does not affect admiralty and
maritime law.”379 Arguably, those entitled to a remedy under general
maritime law, either from “responsible parties” or from others, may
pursue these claims.380 Indeed, at least one court held that the OPA
“preempts maritime law as to recovery of cleanup expenses and the cost
of compensating injured persons.”381 According to this view, the savings
clause “only preserves admiralty claims which are not addressed in
OPA”382 (such as collision damages or personal injuries) and “[b]ecause
OPA provides a comprehensive scheme for the recovery of oil spill
cleanup costs and the compensation of those injured by oil spills, the
general maritime law does not apply to recovery of these types of
damages.”383 But this issue has not yet been addressed by an appellate
court, and is therefore far from settled. Consequently, parties involved in
the Deepwater Horizon operation but not responsible under the OPA,
such as the BOP manufacturer (Cameron International) and the cement
contractor (Halliburton), may end up liable for at least some of the loss
under general maritime law.
2.

State Law

Apart from common law remedies, most coastal states—including
those adjoining the Gulf of Mexico—have oil pollution legislation with
strict, often uncapped, liability provisions.384 State legislation naturally
378. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *6–7 (D. Alaska
Jan. 26, 1994); In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *12 (D. Alaska
Dec. 23, 1992); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16, 1517 (D. Alaska 1991).
379. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2006).
380. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 55–58.
381. Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1447 (E.D.
Va. 1996).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822–46.03.824 (2010); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8670.3,
.56.5 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6207–6209 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.12, .313 (West
2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-51 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128D-6 (LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2004, 2025–2026 (2000 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, §§ 543, 551–52 (2001 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 4-401–4-410
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 5 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 146-A (2005 & Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g (2006 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. NAV.
LAW § 181 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.83–143-215.94 (2009 &
Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 468B.300–468B.335 (2003 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS
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varies with respect to recoverable losses (purely economic losses in
particular), liability caps, defenses, etc.385
The enactment of the OPA rekindled the debate on the interplay
between federal and state law. The House of Representatives’ version of
the bill stated that “except as provided in this Act . . . no action arising
out of a discharge of oil . . . may be brought in any court of the United
States or of any State”; but following staunch opposition of the Senate,
environmental groups, the National Association of Attorneys General,
and others, an amendment to preserve state power was introduced and
ultimately passed.386 The Senate bill similarly preserved states’ authority
to impose additional liability.387 The compromise bill reported by the
conference committee unsurprisingly included a savings clause.388
The OPA thus provided that it should not be interpreted “as
preempting the authority of any State. . . from imposing any additional
liability. . . with respect to the discharge of oil. . . within such State” or
as modifying “the obligations or liabilities of any person under. . . State
law, including common law.”389 These clauses explicitly preserved
existing state common law and oil pollution legislation, and allowed
subsequent expansion of liability by the states.390 Moreover, the OPA
superseded the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act of 1851,391
which could limit liability under state law prior to OPA’s enactment.392
Finally, the OPA provides that it should not affect or be construed to
affect “the authority of any State to establish, or to continue in effect, a
fund [that pays] for costs or damages arising out of. . . oil pollution.”393
Two questions arise in this respect. The first is whether purely
economic losses in excess of the OPA limit may be recovered under

§ 46-12-21 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-580–48-43-600 (2008); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
§ 40.202 (West 2001); TEX. WATER CODE § 26.265 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18
(2006); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.56.360–90.56.370 (2010); see also Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi
Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1448 (E.D. Va. 1996) (observing that when
OPA was enacted, twenty-four states had oil spill liability legislation, of which seventeen had no
liability limits).
385. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 3, 54, 61–62.
386. See Millard, supra note 306, at 351–54 (discussing the preemption provision).
387. Id. at 360–61.
388. Id. at 364.
389. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006).
390. See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000) (holding that § 2718(a) was
intended to preserve state laws and powers only with respect to liability and financial requirements).
391. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181–189 (2006).
392. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2006); see also Kiern, supra note 306, at 529–30.
393. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(b) (2006).
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state law. This question may be crucial in the Deepwater Horizon case if
liability under the OPA is limited, that is, if BP’s acts fall short of gross
negligence, willful misconduct, or a violation of an applicable federal
regulation. Given the magnitude of the incident and the nature of the
ensuing losses, allowing recovery for purely economic losses under state
law may increase BP’s overall liability considerably. Admittedly, the
OPA has not put an end to the controversy over the possible preemption
of liability under state law by Robins Dry Dock. Some think that the
OPA allowed the states to extend liability not only beyond the limits set
by the OPA, but also beyond general maritime law, including Robins
Dry Dock.394 Others believe that state power is still subject to Jensen, so
there can be no liability for purely economic loss.395 Some follow the
authority of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,396 holding that given the
Framers’ intent—manifested in the Admiralty Clause of the
Constitution—to secure uniformity in maritime law, Congress’s
legislative power in this area is exclusive and non-delegable; thus, the
OPA’s delegation of power to the states was unconstitutional.397
The second question is whether punitive damages are also allowed
under state law.398 On the one hand, the OPA purports to be
comprehensive, and arguably excludes punitive damages.399 So allowing
such damages under state law might contravene Congress’s intentions,
just as allowing them under general maritime law would. On the other
hand, the OPA explicitly empowers the states to impose “any additional
liability.” This may cover not only liability in excess of the OPA limit in
cases of ordinary negligence, but also punitive damages in cases of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.400

394. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping Co. v.
Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630–31 (1st. Cir. 1994).
395. See Swanson, supra note 38, at 411–15.
396. 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
397. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 2–3, 30–52, 71–72.
398. State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few states award them rarely, or not at all,
and others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many have statutory limits, in the form of
absolute caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or some combination of the
two. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494–98 (2008).
399. See supra notes 355–66 and accompanying text.
400. See Swanson, supra note 38, at 155 (stating that the OPA does not necessarily preempt
punitive damages under state law); Paige Kohn, Note, Oil and Water Do Not Mix: An Argument for
the United States Supreme Court’s Deferral to Congress in Exxon v. Baker, 38 CAP. U. L. REV.
229, 261 (2009).
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A Critical Appraisal of the Current Scheme

At first glance, the OPA seems to comply with the general guidelines
set forth in Part II of this Article. In cases of ordinary negligence,
liability is limited for reasons that partly overlap the traditional
justifications for the exclusionary rule in general maritime law. The
OPA arguably “seeks to balance the need to make industries which
benefit from the transport of oil internalize the costs of pollution, while
at the same time avoiding the possibility that responsible vessel owners
will be driven from the industry with crippling damage awards.”401 In
cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the OPA allows
expansion of liability beyond the general caps, for reasons that overlap
the traditional justifications for punitive damages. Put differently, the
scope of liability is roughly correlated with the severity of the
defendant’s conduct.
Moreover, the expansion of liability in cases of gross negligence or
willful misconduct seems more in line with the general principles of tort
law and more responsive to distributive concerns. First, the OPA
provides that the statutory limits do not apply if the incident was caused
by gross negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible party.402
Second, at least according to South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd.
Partnership,403 the OPA does not allow punitive damages. This seems
reasonable, because the OPA responds to the gravity of the conduct by
removing the caps on damages. So unlike general maritime law, the
OPA expands liability by allowing more victims to recover for their
actual loss, not by allowing a few successful claimants to obtain a
windfall while leaving all other victims uncompensated. It seemingly
makes the punishment fit the crime without using extra-compensatory
damages. The odd outcome of the simultaneous application of the
exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine—many
uncompensated victims and an overcompensated few—is avoided.
However, the OPA does not provide a satisfactory solution for the
fundamental problem, namely setting the proper limit on liability in light
of all relevant factors. Assume first that the responsible party is guilty of
mere negligence. Like general maritime law, the OPA limits liability,
but differently. Rather than excluding liability for purely economic
losses (subject to the fishermen’s exception), the OPA allows recovery
for proximately caused purely economic losses but sets a cap on overall
401. Harrington, supra note 306, at 2, 17.
402. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006).
403. 234 F.3d 58, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2000).
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liability. This is crucial if there is a normatively relevant difference
between purely economic losses and other types of injury, or if allowing
claims by more victims has other unwarranted consequences. For
instance, given the limited pool that successful claimants ultimately need
to share under the OPA, liability for relational economic losses may
forestall full recovery for injuries to physical interests that may be
deemed more worthy of legal protection. Additionally, each victim may
end up with compensation for a very small fraction of his or her loss,
making the costly process futile. Furthermore, liability limits are
determined somewhat arbitrarily, without taking into account factors that
seem relevant to determining the scope of liability. For example, if many
relational economic losses are not true social costs, recovery for these
losses in cases of ordinary negligence should be generally denied.
Therefore, if the extent of injuries to tangible resources, including
personal property and natural resources, is lower than the statutory cap,
liability under the OPA—which also covers purely economic losses—
will exceed the proper amount.
Now assume the defendant is guilty of gross negligence, recklessness,
or willful misconduct. In that case, the OPA imposes liability for all
proximately caused harm, including purely economic losses. This is
clearly inconsistent with my theoretical analysis and the proposed
model. I explained that even where the traditional justifications for
punitive damages emerge and call for an expansion of liability, the
normatively desirable scope of liability might still be lower than the
aggregate loss, including relational economic losses.404 Simply put,
liability for all proximately caused harm may be excessive. The OPA
seems to ignore this possibility.
Additionally, if liability is expanded beyond the default to achieve the
traditional goals of punitive damages, the extent of liability should
reflect the relative gravity of the wrong. The United States Supreme
Court thus held that the main guideposts considered in reviewing
punitive damages awards are the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s misconduct,405 and the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages.406 More egregious conduct entails a higher ratio.
A supplementary distinction applies in maritime law: in cases of
recklessness that do not raise unique enforcement problems, the ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages cannot exceed 1:1,407
404. See supra Part II.C.
405. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–80 (1996).
406. Id. at 580–83.
407. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 510–15 (2008).
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though this limit does not apply in cases of more egregious conduct,
such as malice or avarice.408 The proposed model similarly determines
the proper amount of damages in light of the relevant factors, including
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and then allows recovery
for actual losses incrementally up to the desirable amount. The OPA, on
the other hand, lays down a dichotomous rule: limited liability in cases
of mere negligence (or no fault), and unlimited liability in more severe
cases. As long as the defendant is guilty of more than mere negligence,
the scope of liability is not affected by the relative gravity of the wrong.
Gross negligence, recklessness, malice, etc., are treated equally.
Moreover, the OPA seemingly precludes punitive damages. In Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker,409 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FWPCA
did not preempt punitive damages.410 This conclusion seems defensible
because the FWPCA did not provide for additional liability for actual
harm in the case of gross negligence. The OPA does, so punitive
damages seem redundant. However, as explained in Part II.C above, in
rare cases the normatively desirable scope of liability may exceed the
aggregate provable loss, including relational economic losses. In those
cases, all victims should be allowed to recover, and punitive damages
should be awarded up to the necessary level. As currently interpreted,
the OPA does not allow punitive damages at all. An alternative—and
proper—interpretation would be that while punitive damages should
generally be denied, they can be awarded in very rare cases in which
removing liability caps is insufficient.
Furthermore, the OPA lifts liability caps not only if the incident was
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, but also if it was
caused by “the violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or
operating regulation.”411 Such violations may at times be technical and
petty. Thus, the Act enables expansion of liability even in cases that do
not manifest the level of reprehensibility traditionally associated with
punitive damages. Uncapped liability may be permitted even when the
justifications for limiting liability apply, while the justifications for
expanding liability do not.
Finally, I explained above that the exclusionary rule provided a
certain and easily applicable limit on tort liability, and that the punitive
damages doctrine reinstated some uncertainty due to the stark

408. See also Jones, supra note 149, at 1302.
409. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
410. Id. at 488–89.
411. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B) (2006).

021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

DEEPWATER HORIZON AND CIVIL LIABILITY

21/02/2011 11:09

65

unpredictability of the awards.412 However, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that in reviewing awards of punitive damages under the Due Process
Clause, courts ought to consider three guideposts, which reduce the level
of uncertainty.413 The Court further reduced uncertainty in general
maritime law (as opposed to land-based law), holding that the ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages in cases of recklessness
should not exceed 1:1.414 The OPA seems quite responsive to the need
for certainty in cases of ordinary negligence, but is less sensitive to this
concern in cases of gross negligence, recklessness, and willful
misconduct. While the extent of liability for ordinary negligence under
the Act is clear-cut, liability for more serious wrongdoing is truly openended. There are neither limits nor guideposts, so the ultimate scope of
liability is utterly unpredictable. Congress may address this problem by
replacing the limited/unlimited liability dichotomy with differential
limits.415
To conclude, the OPA represents a commendable step. It responds to
reprehensible conduct by allowing more victims to recover for their
actual losses, not by allowing a few successful claimants to obtain a
windfall while leaving all other victims uncompensated. However, it
does not fully conform to the general guidelines set forth in Part II.C.
More importantly, as explained in Part II.B, the problem of simultaneous
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine
transcends the unique setting of catastrophic oil spills. Any achievement
of the OPA is limited to the esoteric case of marine oil pollution,
whereas the general problem remains.
The OPA savings clauses further complicate the situation. On the one
hand, allowing states to impose unlimited liability makes the most
significant feature of the reform, namely liability caps, practically
meaningless. As one commentator noted, Congress attempted to make
responsible parties assume as much of the burden for prevention and
cleanup as possible without subjecting them to financial ruin.416 But
“with a single, superficially simple provision, [Congress] upset this

412. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–501.
413. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996).
414. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 510–15.
415. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a–451(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010), which provides that a
person who causes pollution is liable for all removal costs, that if the pollution was negligently
caused, that person may be liable for damages up to 1.5 times the cost incurred, and that if the
pollution was willfully caused, that person may be liable for damages equal to two times the cost
incurred.
416. Harrington, supra note 306, at 12.
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balance by permitting states to impose unlimited strict liability on
vessels which discharge oil into state waters.”417 State legislation which
allows unlimited recovery for purely economic losses reinstates the
initial problem of open-ended liability. On the other hand, the possibility
of awarding punitive damages under state law in cases of gross
negligence, recklessness or malice, may be used to remedy one of the
lesser flaws of the OPA. Lifting liability caps, along with criminal and
civil fines, will usually provide sufficient levels of retribution and
deterrence in cases of this sort. Punitive damages may nonetheless be
appropriate in very exceptional cases where all other sanctions seem
inadequate.
CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill holds the dubious title of the largest
accidental release of oil in world history. As opposed to the Exxon
Valdez case, which was litigated for nearly two decades under general
maritime law and area-specific legislation, the Deepwater Horizon
incident is subject to the Oil Pollution Act, which was enacted in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez spill. The purpose of this Article has been to
illuminate a general problem in American land-based and maritime tort
law that surfaced against the backdrop of the Exxon litigation, and to
examine whether subsequent statutory reform has eliminated the
problem in the limited context of marine oil pollution, using the
Deepwater Horizon incident as a test case.
Part I discussed pre-OPA law as applied to the Exxon Valdez case. It
first showed that relational economic losses were generally irrecoverable
under Robins Dry Dock, and reviewed the main justifications for the
exclusionary rule, including the fear of open-ended liability, the idea that
many relational losses are not true social costs, victims’ ability to protect
themselves, and the simplicity of the bright-line rule. In accordance with
the Oppen exception to the exclusionary rule, Exxon was found liable
for the lost catch of commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives, but all
other claims for relational losses were rejected. Part I then explained the
concept of punitive damages and its dominant justifications, namely
retribution and deterrence. In the Exxon Valdez case, the jury awarded
the successful claimants $5 billion in punitive damages. The issue went
back and forth between the district court and the court of appeals, until
the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reduced the punitive award to $507.5

417. Id. at 2.
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million. Lastly, Part I discussed relevant federal and state legislation,
such as the TAPAA, and the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act,
invoked by the claimants in the Exxon Valdez litigation.
Part II explained why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to incongruity
on the justificatory level. Applying the exclusionary rule and the
punitive damages doctrine in tandem in a particular case pulls the limits
of civil liability in opposing directions. Each rule seemingly cancels out
the warranted effects of the other, at least to some extent. Moreover,
applying the two rules in a single case futilely violates general principles
of tort law and generates distributive injustice. Part II then delineated the
contours of the problem, showing that although it surfaced in a marine
oil pollution setting, it is essentially a general weakness of maritime and
land-based common law. Finally, Part II proposed a conceptual
framework for resolution of the problem. Generally, it held that where
liability must be expanded beyond the limits set by the exclusionary rule
in order to obtain certain levels of deterrence and retribution, relaxing
the exclusionary rule and allowing more victims to recover is a more
defensible path than awarding punitive damages to a very few successful
claimants.
Part III examined whether the enactment of the OPA has created a
more defensible liability regime, using the Deepwater Horizon incident
as a test case. The Act imposes strict but limited liability on parties
responsible for vessels and facilities from which oil is discharged into
U.S. waters. Responsible parties are liable for removal costs and various
damages, including harm to natural resources and relational economic
losses, up to the statutory caps. In the case of gross negligence,
recklessness, or willful misconduct, liability caps are lifted, but punitive
damages are apparently precluded. Put differently, while general
maritime law responds to severe misconduct by allowing a very
exclusive group of successful claimants to obtain extra-compensatory
payments, the OPA removes the statutory limit on the defendant’s
liability to a much more inclusive group of recognized claimants. This
seemingly simple scheme was muddled by the “savings clauses”
whereby states were allowed to impose additional liability for oil
discharges.
At first glance, the OPA seems to comply with the general guidelines
set forth in Part II. In cases of ordinary negligence liability is limited, for
reasons that partly overlap the traditional justifications for the
exclusionary rule in general maritime law. In cases of more egregious
conduct, the OPA allows expansion of liability beyond the general caps,
for reasons that overlap the traditional justifications for punitive
damages. The scope of liability is roughly correlated with the gravity of
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the defendant’s conduct, and the expansion of liability in cases of severe
misconduct better corresponds to the general principles of tort law and to
distributive concerns. Part III showed, however, that the OPA did not
provide a satisfactory solution for the fundamental problem. For
example, in cases of ordinary negligence, where the caps apply, liability
for relational losses may forestall full recovery for injuries to more
important interests, and each victim may end up with fractional
compensation, making the costly process futile. Also, the caps are
somewhat arbitrary because they are insensitive to factors that seem
relevant in determining the proper scope of liability, such as the fact that
many relational losses are not true social costs. In cases of gross
negligence the OPA lifts the caps altogether, although the normatively
desirable scope of liability might be lower than the aggregate loss,
including relational losses. Moreover, as long as the defendant is guilty
of more than mere negligence, the OPA is insensitive to the relative
gravity of the wrong. Furthermore, the OPA seems to preclude punitive
damages, although there may be rare cases in which liability must
exceed the aggregate provable loss. The savings clauses further
complicate the situation. Allowing states to impose unlimited liability
makes the most significant contribution of the OPA, namely liability
caps, practically meaningless. But the possibility of awarding punitive
damages under state law may alleviate one of its alleged shortcomings.
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, there have been calls for
raising the OPA caps, or an even more comprehensive legislative
reform. While some of the initiatives seem to have waned, this
catastrophic incident, like the earlier Exxon Valdez case, will surely
leave its mark. I hope that in reassessing the law applicable to marine oil
pollution, policymakers will find some guidance in this Article, which
highlights relevant concerns. Of course, as repeatedly noted, the Article
has focused on a specific fact-situation, but these concerns are general
and ought to be taken into consideration in any attempt to delineate the
limits of civil liability.

